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ABSTRACT
The present thesis is an investigation on an open problem in 
mathematical logic: the problem of devising an explanation of 
the meaning of the intuitionistic first-order logical operators, 
which is both mathematically rigorous and faithful to the 
interpretation intended by the intuitionistic mathematicians 
who invented and have been using them. This problem has 
been outstanding since the early thirties, when it was 
formulated and addressed for the first time.
The thesis includes a historical, expository part, which 
focuses on the contributions of Kolmogorov, Heyting, Gentzen 
and Kreisel, and a long and detailed discussion of the various 
interpretations which have been proposed by these and other 
authors. Special attention is paid to the decidability of the 
proof relation and the introduction of Kreisel’s extra-clauses, 
to the various notions of ‘canonical proof' and to the attempt 
to reformulate the semantic definition in terms of proofs from 
premises.
In this thesis I include a conclusive argument to the effect 
that if one wants to withdraw the extra-clauses then one
cannot maintain the concept of ‘proof' as the basic concept of 
the definition; instead, I describe an alternative interpret­
ation based on the concept of a construction ‘performing' the 
operations indicated by a given sentence, and I show that it 
is not equivalent to the verificationist interpretation.
I point out a redundancy in the internal -pseudo-inductive- 
structure of Kreisel's interpretation and I propose a way to 
resolve it. Finally, I develop the interpretation in terms of 
proofs from premises and show that a precise formulation of 
it must also make use of non-inductive clauses, not for the 
definition of the conditional but -surprisingly enough- for the 
definitions of disjunction and of the existential quantifier.
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CHAPTER 0 
INTRODUCTION
§0.1. The topic of this thesis and its significance
The present thesis is an investigation into an open problem 
in mathematical logic: the problem of devising an explanation 
of the meaning of the intuitionistic first-order logical opera­
tors, which is both mathematically rigorous and faithful to 
the interpretation intended by the intuitionistic mathe­
maticians who invented and have been using them.
This problem has been outstanding since the early thirties, 
when it was formulated and addressed for the first time; since 
then, the amount of literature dealing with it has never 
stopped growing, but no satisfactory solution has as yet been 
attained. As we shall see throughout the thesis, the difficul­
ties in solving this problem are largely of a conceptual or 
philosophical nature.
The explanations of the intuitionistic logical operators 
could be used to define a genuine semantics for the in­
tuitionistic predicate calculus. At present, none of the models
14
which are being used for its metamathematical study, in spite 
of being formally adequate, can be properly motivated as the 
intended interpretation of that calculus.
Moreover, a positive solution to this problem would cons­
titute a very big step towards the clarification of the whole in­
tuitionistic project for the foundations of mathematics, and of 
the notion of ‘constructive proof’ in particular. In turn, if it 
could be shown that such an explanation is not possible this 
would be a strong support for the view of some, that behind 
intuitionistic mathematics there is not a coherent conception 
at all.
Finally, the work of Michael Dummett in recent times has 
connected intuitionistic logic with a number of philosophical 
issues. In particular, the intuitionistic informal explanations 
of the logical operators has been pointed out as the prototype 
of a verificationist theory of meaning for a natural language, 
which Dummett has been trying to reformulate. Hence the 
feasibility of such a theory -one of the few theories of meaning 
around- seems to depend on the possibility of making those 
explanations more rigorous.
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A final remark to make on the topic of the thesis is the 
following. As is only natural, the various attempts which have 
been made to define the intended interpretation of the 
intuitionistic logical constants make ample use of the notion 
of ‘mathematical construction’, which is, within constructive 
mathematics, evidently the most basic notion of all.
From the sixties onwards various ‘theories of constructions’ 
have been attempted to provide an explicit characterization 
of this notion -none of them having yet reached a satisfactory 
stage. The investigation of those theories lies, however, 
beyond the scope of this thesis, and I shall only refer to them  
at some points where the definition of the logical operators 
would crucially depend on the particular way in which the 
notion of ‘construction’ were to be defined.
16
§0.2. Summaxy of contents
0.2.1. Chapter 1. This thesis has three chapters, apart from 
the present, introductory one.
In the first chapter I examine the principal attempts which 
have been made to resolve the problem of this mainly with an 
expository purpose. I start with Brouwer, because although he 
never set out to give an explicit definition of the intuitionistic 
logical operators, he was the main person who invented them, 
and the first to use them systematically for doing mathe­
matics. Also, in this first section I outline the basic ideas of 
the verificationist interpretation, and introduce the inter­
pretation which I shall call ‘operational’, linking both of them  
directly to Brouwer’s writings.
Then I devote separate sections to the two first authors 
who, in the early thirties, clearly posed the question of the 
thesis and tried to give an answer to it -Kolmogorov and 
Heyting-; and a short section to examine Gentzen’s important 
contribution about the same time.
Finally, the fifth and last section of Chapter 1 is dedicated 
to the study of Kreisel’s approach in the sixties, and in
17
particular to the introduction of what has become known as 
the ‘extra-clauses'.
As I go along I examine some of the more obvious problems 
of all these proposals -in particular, for instance, the objec­
tions raised against the extra-clauses-, although most of the 
critical discussion is located in the second chapter.
0.2.2. Chapter 2. This chapter opens with a discussion about 
the decidability of the proof relation (i.e. whether we should 
consider that, in general, (c proves A  is decidable), and its 
relation to the interpretation of the logical constants.
Then I devote a section to developing the operationalist 
interpretation and to emphasizing the differences between 
this and the verificationist interpretation, which have so often 
been neglected. There follows another section in which I 
re-examine Kreisel’s interpretation; I point out a curious 
redundancy or imprecision in the internal -pseudo-inductive- 
structure of the definition, and I propose a way of correcting 
it.
Afterwards there are two sections on canonical proofs, in 
which I examine the various proposals that have been made
18
to define such a special notion of proof and to give the 
definitions of the logical operators in terms of this notion. I 
study the distinct motivations which lie behind these pro­
posals and the difficulties, in each case, of elaborating a 
precise definition which satisfies them.
Finally, there is a section on proofs from premises and 
another on proofs with free variables. In these cases the idea 
is to define a broader notion than that of ‘straight' or ‘cate­
gorical proof', and to give the interpretation of the logical 
operators using it.
0.2.3. Chapter 3. The third and final chapter has two sections 
only. In the first one I discuss the current interpretations of 
intuitionistic logic and why none of them, despite being so 
successful from the formal point of view, can be truly said to 
encapsulate the intended interpretation of the logical operat­
ors.
In the second section of this chapter I touch upon the 
efforts that have been made by some philosophers to show 
that it is impossible to give a precise explanation of the 
intuitionistic logical constants because there are inherent in­
19
consistencies in the very conception of these constants as 
distinct from the classical ones. This is a topic which would 
require a much longer treatment, since intuitionism has been 
traditionally criticized for the vagueness of its philosophical 
motivation, and the arguments formulated in this respect, and 
in particular against the intuitionistic conception of the 
logical constants, are very numerous; however, I shall restrict 
myself to the consideration of a few of the most recent ones 
only, more as a sample than as a comprehensive survey.
0.2.4. The Conclusion. Finally, the last part of the thesis 
-before the Bibliography- is the Conclusion, in which I make 
a tentative diagnosis on the present state of the debate over 
our problem, the intended interpretation of the intuitionistic 
first-order logical operators.
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§0.3. Original content of the thesis
In short, the originality of this thesis lies in the following 
points:
(a) I argue that if one wants to withdraw Kreisel’s extra­
clauses then one cannot maintain the concept of ‘proof' as the 
basic concept of the semantic definition of the logical cons­
tants (§2.1).
This concerns one of the two most frequent presentations 
of the verificationist interpretation, favoured for example in 
textbooks such as Troelstra and van Dalen [1988] (p. 9). In 
particular, I point out a number of distinct paradoxes which 
arise from this type of version, and which show quite patently 
that it is untenable.
On the other hand, it is to be noted that the role that these 
explanations play in those textbooks is essentially heuristic 
and not technical, so that there is no fear that an error in the 
explanations might lead to any other problem.
(b) In relation to this, I describe and discuss an alternative 
interpretation which does not make use of the extra-clauses, 
based on the concept of a construction ‘performing’ the 
operations indicated by a given sentence (§2.2). I call this
21
interpretation ‘operational’, I show that the differences 
between it and the verificationist are not at all trivial, and 
I illustrate how the operational interpretation is largely 
supported by Brouwer’s and Heyting’s ideas -despite the fact 
that, for example already in Heyting’s writings, the difference 
between the two interpretations is explicitly neglected.
Moreover, this new interpretation would also constitute a 
prototype for an anti-realist theory of meaning for a natural 
language, which could perhaps be developed in a parallel way 
to the verificationist theory, constituting a possible alternat­
ive to it.
(c) I point out a curious redundancy or imprecision in the 
internal -pseudo-inductive- structure of Kreisel’s interpreta­
tion -i.e. with the extra-clauses (§2.3). In light of this redun­
dancy the current version of Kreisel’s interpretation appears 
to be either incorrect or at least very inelegant; however, the 
only way to resolve it seems to require that we have previous­
ly defined an interpretation akin to the operational one, and 
this has further consequences for the viability of each 
interpretation and the relation between them.
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(d) The interpretation in terms of proofs from premises and, 
relatedly, in terms of free variables are subjected to a 
thorough discussion most of which is totally unprecedented 
-in fact Dummett is virtually the only author who has been 
careful to distinguish between these types of interpretations 
and the other ones. In particular, I show how the notion of 
‘proof from premises’, which prima facie constitutes a solution 
for the inductive definition of the conditional, after a con­
sistent development turns out to originate a very similar 
problem in the definitions of disjunction and the existential 
quantifier -a most surprising result (§2.6).
(e) Finally, the whole structure of the thesis has been 
conceived in an original and independent way. In comparison 
with other survey articles on this topic such as van Dalen 
[1979] or Sundholm [1983], the thesis is not only -obviously - 
longer, but it attempts to cover the most recent literature; it 
focuses on careful historical distinctions which have been 
traditionally ignored -e.g. the difference between Heyting’s 
and Kolmogorov’s interpretation (1.3.5, §2.6)-; it contains 
clear expositions of topics such as canonical proofs -singling 
out four distinct and independent reasons which have been
given for introducing them (2.4.1, 2.4.4, 2.5.2 and 2.5.5)-; and 
finally, it also includes a discussion of some hostile arguments 
against the feasibility of the whole project of formulating a 
precise semantic explanation (§3.2).
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§0.4. The intuitionistic Ideology9 and the study of intuitionism  
today
“Here constructivism is to be understood in the wide sense (...)• 
The ending ‘-ism’ has ideological overtones: ‘constructive mathe­
matics is the (only) right mathematics’; we hasten, however, to 
declare that we do not subscribe to this ideology, and that we do 
not intend to present our material on such a basis.” (Anne Sjerp 
Troelstra and Dirk van Dalen [1988], p. vii).
These words, written at the beginning of one of the major 
handbooks on the subject, express the declared attitude of the 
majority of mathematicians and philosophers who work today 
in the field of constructivism. There are still some strict 
intuitionists among the great figures (like Dummett), but they 
are few.
I find myself in agreement with this trend, and do not 
adhere either to the intuitionistic or to any constructive ideo­
logy. In particular, I do not subscribe to the view that in­
tuitionism (or constructivism) is the only legitimate direction 
in the foundations of mathematics -philosophy of mathe­
matics, set theory or mathematical logic. To use a terminology 
coined by Kreisel, I subscribe to the positive  thesis of in­
tuitionism -namely, that intuitionism is a coherent, legitimate 
and interesting way of doing mathematics- without endorsing
25
the negative one -i.e., that intuitionism is the only such way, 
and that classical non-constructive mathematics must be 
rejected.
In any case, intuitionism remains one of the most serious 
and promising alternatives in the area of foundations -still a 
very uncertain field- being the only one among the three main 
traditional schools at the beginning of the century which has 
survived mostly in its original form, while not having been 
shaken by adverse results. In addition to this, its applications 
to independent areas of philosophy (such as verificationist 
theories of meaning for natural languages or anti-realist 
metaphysics and epistemology), to classical mathematics (e.g. 
in topos theory and numerical mathematics), to physics and 
to computer science, make intuitionism today a clearly 
interesting subject.
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§0.5. The other main schools of constructive mathematics
0.5,1. The logic of constructive mathematics. Although 
intuitionistic logic was originally created and developed as 
a codification of intuitionistic mathematical reasoning only, 
today it is often considered as representative also of the 
two other main trends of constructive mathematics -the 
Russian school of recursive mathematics and Bishop’s 
constructivism. Thus, in general handbooks on construc­
tivism such as Bridges and Richman [1987] or Troelstra 
and van Dalen [1988] it is at least tacitly assumed that 
intuitionistic logic is the logic of constructive mathematics 
(cf. p. 11 and p. 35 respectively).
0.5.2. The status of M arkov’s principle. In fact intuitionistic 
logic is probably the logic of Bishop’s constructivism, but 
not -it appears to me- that of Russian recursive mathe­
matics. Indeed, my point is that Markov’s principle -the 
main difference between the Russian school and the other 
two- is expressible in intuitionistic first-order logic, for 
example by the following sentence (for a unary relation 
symbol F):
\fx(F  (x) v  ->F (x))->(-'-'3xF(x)^>3xF (x))
(cf. e.g. Dummett [1977], p. 22 or Troelstra and van Dalen 
[1988], p. 203).
Hence it seems that it is a logical principle, in which case 
a correct axiomatization of Russian constructive logic 
should incorporate as axioms all sentences of the language 
in question which take that form. The resulting logic would 
be intermediate between intuitionistic and classical logic, 
and the usual explanations of the intuitionistic logical 
constants would obviously not be adequate to it.
In any case, once it has been shown that the principle is 
expressible in a pure first-order logical vocabulary it could 
seem artificial to continue to regard it as a mathematical 
and not a logical principle -as has sometimes been defend­
ed, e.g. by McCarthy [1994] (p. 105). In particular, it would 
seem incorrect not to take Markov's principle into account 
for a precise explanation of the use of the logical operators 
-and in particular, of the quantifiers- in Russian construc­
tivism.
Of course the principle is not expressible in classical 
logic, where the decidability of the property corresponding
28
to F  does not reduce to the assertion Vx(F(x)v “IJF(x)); but 
that is a completely different matter -surely the logic of 
Russian recursive mathematics is not classical logic either.
0.5.3. More on Markov's principle. In connection with this 
point we should notice the following: constructive mathe­
matics has been repeatedly criticized on the grounds that 
it is not powerful enough for the needs of our most success­
ful physical theories (e.g. Putnam [1975], p. 75). Whether 
this is strictly true or not, it does not pose a problem for 
constructivism as such, which relates to pure, rather than 
applied mathematics.
In particular, an observant intuitionistic mathematician, 
for example, could perhaps agree on the use of classical 
principles as part of a physical theory, as long as it is 
employed to obtain results about the physical reality only. 
There is no reason in principle, for instance, why he could 
not use the law of excluded middle when applied to real 
existing objects even if he cannot determine which of the 
two options holds; and in doing this he would be effectively
29
treating the law of excluded middle as a physical law, in 
spite of being expressible in pure logical terms.
The situation, however, is different from that of the use 
of Markov's principle in Russian recursive mathematics, 
since in that case the principle in question is held by 
Markov and his followers as valid in every domain, and not 
only in a restricted area of phenomena. Hence a distinction 
between it and other logical principles that they accept 
would not have any practical consequences at all.
0.5.4. Conclusion. It is important to notice then, that in this 
thesis we shall be concerned with the intuitionistic logical 
operators only -that is, the logical operators as used by in­
tuitionistic mathematicians. We can take them to be 
broadly representative of constructive mathematical 
reasoning as a whole, but, as we have seen, they do not 
have to coincide exactly with those used in any school of 
constructivism other than the intuitionistic.
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§0.6. Notational conventions and preliminaiy notions 
0.6.1. First-order languages. First-order languages are 
assumed to have the four connectives (a, v, and ”•) and 
the two quantifiers (3 and V) that are needed for in­
tuitionistic purposes. For simplicity I shall restrict myself 
to languages without equality (and hence without function 
symbols other than constants); as is well-known, in­
tuitionistic equality is, in general, a defined non-primitive 
relation.
Most of the interpretations that we shall study in this 
thesis require that first-order languages be enriched with 
a new logical symbol _L, to which they will assign, roughly 
speaking, a basic absurdity. Syntactically this symbol is to 
behave exactly as a new atomic sentence.
When dealing with a fixed first-order language S? I shall
sometimes write ‘variables', ‘formulas', etc, meaning 
-respectively- ‘variables of Jz?', ‘formulas of J?”, etc.
0.6.2. Constructive sets. Following Troelstra and van 
Dalen [1988] I use the term ‘set' for what was traditionally 
called ‘species'. Hence a set will be a definite condition
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determining a certain collection: a condition such that, for 
any previously accepted object, we know what to count as 
a proof that the object satisfies the condition -cf. Dummett 
[1977], p. 38. In other words, a set is given by a decision 
procedure that can be applied to any arbitrary pair of 
constructions (c,d) to determine whether or not c is a proof 
that d  belongs to it.
Moreover, a set will be non-empty (traditionally, ‘in­
habited’) when we know how to produce a particular object 
which satisfies it; and a set is a subset of another set when 
we can prove that all elements of the first are elements of 
the second.
Finally, ‘ce IT is read as ‘we can prove that the construc­
tion c belongs to the set U \ and ‘eg IT as ‘we can prove that 
c does not belong to U \ The symbols ‘rY and ‘u ’ are used for 
intersection and union of sets respectively, and ‘— for the 
complement of a set in another; ‘x’ for the Cartesian 
product of two or more sets, and iUnf for the Cartesian 
product of the set U  with itself n times.
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0.6.3. Constructive interpretations. I now sketch the 
definition of a constructive interpretation for a first-order 
language This definition would have to be completed in
a number of details which I leave here simply outlined. The 
subject of the thesis is precisely the discussion of those 
details.
I first consider the case where the domain of the inter­
pretation is a decidable set, and later I explain how to 
adapt the definition to the case where it is not -a possibility 
which is also accepted by many intuitionists.
Let y  be a first-order language. Then a constructive
interpretation  3  for Jzf consists of the following ingredients.
(a) A set 9S called the domain of 3 , plus a decision proce­
dure whereby we can decide whether or not an arbitrary 
construction c is a member of 9f.
(b) A construction that can be applied to any constant t of 
J^to yield a member 3(£) of 9).
(c) For each m-ary predicate symbol F  of a subset 3(F) 
of 9fn. According to the definition of an intuitionistic set 
this must be given by a decision procedure such that for
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any m-tuple (bv ...,bm) of members of i^and construction c, 
it determines whether or not c is a proof of (blf...,bm)e3(F ). 
Now let xv ...,xn be distinct variables of Jzf, and cp a
formula whose free variables are among xl9...pcn . Then, for 
any 7i-tuple (av ...,an) of members of 3f9 the semantic
definition will associate to (p a statem ent 3(^(alv..,an)), 
which, intuitively, will be the statement made by the 
formula (p under the interpretation 3  when al9...,an are 
taken as the values of xl9...9xn respectively.
0.6.4. More on constructive interpretations. The basic 
semantic definition is given then by induction according to 
the following schema. Let (p be as before, a formula whose 
free variables are among xl9...9xn.
If (p is an atomic sentence F tv ...,tm for some m-ary predi­
cate symbol F  and terms t l9...9tm9 then we let 3(<p(av ...,an)) 
be the atomic statement (61,...,6m)e3(F ), where each bt (for 
l<£</n) is either 3(£t), if is a constant, or a} (for 1 <j<ri) if 
t{ is a variable Xj (in which case, by definition, it has to be 
among xv ...,xn).
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Then, for the specification of the meaning of 3(^(alv..,an)) 
there is little choice, since the only information that we 
have about 3(F) is the decision procedure to check whether 
or not a given construction c is a proof of (bv ...,bm)e3(F ). 
Hence in this case the meaning is given by the proof- 
conditions: the conditions under which c would be a proof 
of 3((p(av .. .,og).
Next, the definition should specify the meaning of the 
statement ~lg?(av ...1an) in terms of the meaning of ^(alv..,an), 
and the meaning of the statements (^A^)(alv..,an), 
(<pvt//)(av ...,an), and (<p->y/)(<21,...,an) in terms of the meanings 
of <p(a1,...,an) and y/(av ...,an). As we shall see in the course 
of the thesis, here there is a greater choice in the way that 
these meanings are recursively given.
Finally, the definition should specify as well the meaning 
of the statements \/xq> and 3x<p in terms of statements of 
the form
where x is the variable Xj (for l<i<h) and a  is also a 
member of and here again there is a wide range of
options.
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The discussion of the thesis is focused, then, in how to 
complete this description with the appropriate explana­
tions. For example, according to one of them, the meaning 
of the statement (q>A y/)(av ...,an) is given by indicating that 
a proof of this statement is a proof of ^(alv..,a j plus a 
proof of t//(av ...yan).
To make the discussion more lively, however, I shall 
often adopt a more informal style, in which we discuss 
directly the interpretation of intuitionistic statements 
without specifying a formal language and so on. In these 
cases both the informal notation and the way to apply it to 
the consideration of will be obvious. For example, a claim 
that ‘the meaning of a statement A a B  is given by specifying 
that a proof of it consists of a proof of A  plus a proof of B ’ 
will be equivalent to the specification mentioned in the 
previous paragraph.
I shall not come back to description of 3 , simply because 
it would take too long to go over all the details each time 
that I discuss a new approach. This adaptation, however, 
will always be straightforward.
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0.6.5. Constructive interpretations with a non-decidable 
domain. Most authors accept non-decidable domains as 
intuitionistically meaningful. In these cases the definition 
of 3  will be modified as follows (cf. e.g. Dummett [1977], p. 
24-25, or Troelstra and van Dalen [1988], p. 9).
First, the domain &  is given simply as an intuitionistic
set, that is, by means of a procedure to decide, for any 
arbitrary pair of constructions (c,rf), whether or not c 
proves However, we do not require a decision proce­
dure to determine whether or not a given arbitrary cons­
truction belongs to in general, we will not be able to
decide this.
Next, the interpretation of each m-ary predicate symbol 
F  will be a decision procedure which acts on any /n-tuple 
(61,...,6m) of constructions given another construction c 
which proves that all bt (for 1 <i<m) belong to 9). Similarly,
if (p is a formula whose free variables are among x v ...,xnJ 
the semantic definition will associate a statement to each 
n-tuple of constructions (av ...,an) given another construc­
tion c which proves that all a, (for 1 <i<ri) belong to
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Finally, the clauses corresponding to the quantifiers will 
also have to refer to a proof that the critical object a  in 
question belongs to 9 .  For example -using informal terms-
if a proof of 3xA(x) is to be defined in the case of a decida- 
ble domain as a construction c plus a proof of A(c), then in 
the case that 9  is not decidable we should require in
addition to this a further proof that c e 9 .
0.6.6. Conventions regarding quotations. I use double 
quotation marks for all quotations. I do not change the 
underlining or italics of the original text unless otherwise 
stated; however, I  have changed the original notation in 
most quotations, to make them fit with one another and 
with the notation which I use in the thesis, in order to 
facilitate the reading.
The pages referred to will be those of the edition which 
is mentioned in the ‘Bibliography’ in the first place; that 
edition does not always coincide with the original -earliest- 
one, but is often the most easily available today.
Finally, when I quote from a paper which has not been 
translated into English I use my own translation, but I
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reproduce the original text in footnotes.
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CHAPTER 1 
THE SEARCH FOR THE INTENDED 
INTERPRETATION: EXPOSITION
§1.1. Brouwers use of the logical constants
1.1.1. Introduction. Any search for the intended meaning of 
the intuitionistic logical operators must in one way or other 
start with Brouwer, the founder of intuitionism, the main 
person who invented them and the first who used them 
systematically for doing mathematics. Naturally, these 
operators have later been used by other intuitionistic mathe­
maticians apart from Brouwer, but apparently with very few 
changes.
As is well-known, Brouwer did not have a great interest in 
mathematical logic, and he never committed himself to giving 
a rigorous explanation of the logical operators; the actual use 
that he made of them in his proofs of intuitionistic theorems, 
plus a number of observations accompanying those proofs, 
were enough for him.
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The task of turning this use into an explicit characteriza­
tion starts with Kolmogorov and Heyting. In the present 
section I shall briefly discuss a few of Brouwer’s original 
writings, mainly as a reference for the rest of the chapter -a 
fairly recent and thorough study of Brouwer’s writings and 
life is van Stigt [1990].
1.1.2. Verificationist interpretations: meaning as provability. 
As we shall see throughout this chapter, most attempts to 
define the intended interpretation of the intuitionistic logical 
operators take as the basic key concept the notion of ‘proof’.
The idea is to equate the meaning of a mathematical 
statement with its provability conditions. That is: to give the 
interpretation of a statement by means of a definition of what 
is to be a proof of it.
This seems more adequate for intuitionistic semantics given 
that, in contrast with the structural (platonistic) point of 
view, intuitionistic mathematics focuses primarily on the 
subject (the creative mathematician) and his ability to 
perform certain mathematical operations by applying his 
previously designed constructions {knowing how). Hence a
notion such as ‘proof', which refers to the successful comple­
tion of a human action, appears to be more suitable than that 
of ‘truth'.
On the other hand, classical mathematics focuses essential­
ly on the object: eternal pre-existing mathematical structures 
{knowing that); and for this reason, the notion of ‘truth’, with 
its prominent descriptive untensed character, is more ap­
propriate. Of course we can also use the predicate ‘true' with 
its intuitionistic sense -e.g. as ‘having been proved', as many 
intuitionistic mathematicians do; but that could be misleading 
to a classical mathematician if we do not make our intention 
explicit, especially in the context of a semantic definition.
The idea that intuitionistic meaning should be equated with 
the proof-conditions is implicit in many of Brouwer's writings, 
although he never states it directly. The following quotation 
is a relatively clear illustration. It is taken from the Cam­
bridge Lectures, but the same idea is expressed in many 
others of his papers, sometimes with almost the same words 
(cf. e.g. [1955], pp. 551-552).
“Classical logic presupposed that independently of human 
thought there is a truth , part of which is expressible by means of 
sentences called ‘true assertions’, mainly assigning certain
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properties to certain objects or stating that objects possessing 
certain properties exist or that certain phenomena behave 
according to certain laws.
(...)
“Only after mathematics had been recognized as an autonomous 
interior constructional activity (...) the criterion of truth and 
falsehood of a mathematical assertion was confined to mathe­
matical activity itself, without appeal to logic or to hypothetical 
omniscient beings. An immediate consequence was that for a 
mathematical assertion A the two cases of truth and falsehood, 
formerly exclusively admitted, were replaced by the following 
three:
(1) A has been proved to be true;
(2) A  has been proved to be absurd;
(3) A  has neither been proved to be true nor to be absurd, nor do 
we know a finite algorithm leading to the statement either that A  
is true or that A is absurd.” ([1981], pp. 90-92).
In a footnote he adds: “the case that A  has neither been
proved to be true nor to be absurd, but that we know a finite
algorithm leading to the statement either that A  is true, or 
that A  is absurd, obviously is reducible to the first and second 
cases” (p. 92).
1.1.3. Verificationist interpretations: meaning as problem­
solving. A variant on this view is to consider that every 
mathematical statement is the statement of a problem, to be 
solved either positively or negatively. This is the idea ex­
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ploited in Kolmogorov's interpretation, and is also suggested 
more or less directly by Brouwer's writings in some places. 
For example in [1928] he urges the formalists to accept
“(...) the identification of the principle of excluded middle with 
the principle of the solvability of every mathematical problem.” (p. 
491).
This identification means that the principle of excluded 
middle holds if and only if each mathematical problem is 
solvable. In the direction from right to left the implication is 
obvious: if every mathematical problem were solvable then 
the principle of excluded middle could not fail to hold. 
However, the implication in the other direction, that is, from 
excluded middle to the principle of solvability, seems to entail 
that the meaning of each statement is the formulation of a 
mathematical problem. Otherwise we could not understand 
why the fact that either a statement or its negation holds 
entails that the respective problem is solvable.
Of course in classical mathematics we can also assign to 
each statement a corresponding problem -the problem of 
proving that what the statement affirms is true; but that 
would only be an oblique interpretation with respect to the 
primary meaning of the statement -which, e.g. under the
44
platonistic view, would be the statement of a mathematical 
‘fact’.
1.1.4. The operational interpretation. Finally, in Brouwer's 
writings we also find support for a more basic explanation of 
the meaning of mathematical statements, in terms of element­
ary manipulations with mathematical constructions. I shall 
call this interpretation ‘operational', here and in the rest of 
the thesis -the term was suggested to me by Professor 
Machover; it appeared in Prawitz [1973] (p. 231) in reference 
to the verificationist interpretation, but it has not been used 
again since then.
The idea of the operational interpretation is that a mathe­
matical statement expresses an expectation that the result of 
performing a particular construction will satisfy certain 
properties, or better, that it will agree with the constructions 
corresponding to those properties, if they are also completely 
effected. This idea is very well-known, and indeed essential to 
intuitionism and to Brouwer's thinking. Here are a couple of 
quotes, from Brouwer's PhD Dissertation and from [1923]:
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“Often it is quite simple to construct inside such a structure, 
independently of how it originated, new structures, as the 
elements of which we take elements of the original structure or 
systems of these, arranged in a new way, but bearing in mind their 
original arrangement. The so-called ‘properties’ of a system express 
the possibility of constructing such new systems having a certain 
connection with the given system.
“And it is exactly this imbedding of new systems in a given 
system that plays an important part in building up mathematics 
(...).” ([1907], p. 52).
“Within the limits of a definite finite main system one can 
always test, that is prove or reduce to absurdity the properties of 
the system, i.e. test whether a system can be fitted into another 
according to prescribed incidence of elements since the fitting-in 
as determined by the property can in every case be executed in 
only a finite number of ways, which each in turn can be under­
taken and pursued either until it is successfully completed or until 
it gets stuck.” ([1923], p. 235; this translation, however, is from 
van Stigt [1990], p. 243).
In the case of a numerical equality over natural numbers, 
for example, this would mean that the two completed cons­
tructions fit perfectly well into each other; for example 
‘122=144’ would mean that the result of effecting both sides of 
the equality comes to the same final construction.
In the case of an atomic statement other than an equality, 
this would mean that the constructions corresponding to the 
objects involved satisfy the construction corresponding to the
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relation in question; for example the meaning of ‘211213-1  is 
prime' would be that the result of effecting the operation 
2H213-1 would satisfy positively the constructive procedure to 
test the property of ‘being prime'.
On the other hand, in the case of more complex statements, 
the expectation would be that some simpler constructions can 
be connected according to the main logical operator, which 
itself would be a constructive procedure of some kind.
1.1.5. The verificationist versus the operational interpreta­
tion. The operational explanation is fairly close to the 
provability or verificationist interpretation, and has been 
assimilated to it by most authors. The point would be that the 
proof of a statement consists precisely in producing the 
mathematical construction which the statement demands.
Brouwer himself seems to support this identification when 
he writes, for example, “the words of your mathematical 
demonstration merely accompany a mathematical construct­
ion that is effected without words” ([1907], p. 73).
However, as I shall stress again and again throughout the 
thesis, this identification is correct only in the cases where it
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is obvious that the construction which has been produced has 
the required properties -in particular, for instance, with 
proofs of atomic statements. In general however, the proof of 
the statement in question will have to include not only the 
required construction, but also an argument that it is in effect 
such a construction; and in some cases this argument may 
necessarily be very complicated.
This is not the time, however, to carry on this discussion. 
It is enough to notice that the two interpretations may not 
coincide, and that we should not equate them beforehand.
1.1.6. The meaning of negation. As Brouwer made clear many 
times, for him to negate a mathematical statement was to 
claim the absurdity or impossibility of what the statement 
says. Apparently, Brouwer was not the first person to 
conceive negation in this way; it seems that similar defini­
tions had been given before at least by Husserl and Oskar 
Becker (cf. Heyting [1931], p. 59).
Indeed, Brouwer often writes ‘is absurd' and similar 
phrases instead of ‘not' or ‘is false'; for example, he formulates 
the law of excluded middle as the principle that every
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property is either correct or impossible ([1923], p. 335). In 
[1949] he says: “by non-equivalence we understand absurdity 
of equivalence, just as by noncontradictority we understand 
absurdity of contradictority” (p. 95, footnote 2); and sometimes 
he even writes “false i.e. absurd” (e.g. [1955], p. 552).
In classical mathematics to say th a t a statem ent is ‘absurd’ 
means that it is obviously false, something which has to do 
more with the psychological perception of the statement than 
with the statement itself. ‘Absurdity’ in this sense, is not a 
proper technical term of classical mathematics.
In intuitionistic mathematics, on the contrary, ‘absurdity’ 
is the most interesting way of expressing negation. The 
absurdity of a hypothetical construction means tha t not only 
is it difficult to effect it -because it requires great ingenuity or 
hard work- but that it is intrinsically impossible, so that we 
shall no longer bother to attempt it.
Sometimes the absurdity is plain to see and does not need 
any demonstration (e.g. ‘1=2’: it is obvious tha t the two 
constructions do not ‘agree’ or fit into each other). Some other 
times the absurdity is not obvious but we can find a way of
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reducing the constructions in question to a point where the 
impossibility becomes clear.
It is for this reason that some later authors define a 
negation i A as the conditional statement A —»_L, where ±  is a 
fixed absurdity. In fact ±  is often called a ‘contradiction', but 
that must not be interpreted in the classical sense (e.g. as any 
statement of the form B a^B), because then it would be 
obviously vacuous.
Instead, we can take l a s a  basic absurdity -such as ‘1=2'-, 
whose only role is to make absolutely evident that the 
construction which has been reduced to it is impossible: “at 
the point where you enounce the contradiction, I simply 
perceive that the construction no longer goes, that the re­
quired structure cannot be imbedded in the given basic 
structure.” ([1907], p. 73).
Later, Dummett [1977] has suggested that given a decida- 
ble atomic statement B  we could identify ±  with Ba '-'B, where 
the meaning of “•B  would be given directly by the decision 
procedure attached to it. Then, anyone who understands the 
decision procedure will recognize that it is impossible for it to 
give two opposing results, and hence that whichever cons­
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truction that has been reduced to such a statement is also 
impossible.
Other authors, in a vaguely similar way to Kripke seman­
tics, have defined a proof of tA directly as ‘a proof that there 
cannot be a proof of A' (Bell and Machover [1977], p. 406, and 
Dummett himself in [1976], p. 110). However, it is difficult to 
make constructive sense of this idea independently of the 
reduction to a basic absurdity. For, in general, the impos­
sibility of a complicated construction will not be plain to see, 
and will have to be shown by means of a reduction of this 
construction to another, elementary one, whose absurdity is 
obvious.
On the other hand, the claim is not simply that as a m atter 
of fact we shall never be able to perform A -e.g. because A is 
too complicated-, but that A is intrinsically impossible. 
However, we cannot admit a priori this type of impossibility 
because that would imply a certain reification over the 
universe of constructions: constructions are not assumed to 
exist or not (to be possible or impossible) independently of us 
-independently of our ability to prove it so.
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Hence the only way of making sense of this idea is, again, 
by means of a reduction of A to a basic impossibility.
1.1.7. Negation and hypothetical constructions. As for 
hypothetical constructions, there is a passage in Brouwer's 
PhD Dissertation which has misled some into believing that 
he rejected them:
“In one particular case the chain of syllogisms is of a 
somewhat different kind, which seems to come nearer to the usual 
logical figures and which actually seems to presuppose the 
hypothetical judgement from logic. This occurs when a structure 
is defined by some relation in another structure, while it is not 
immediately clear how to effect its construction. Here it seems 
that the construction is supposed to be effected, and that starting 
from this hypothesis a chain of hypothetical judgements is 
deduced. But this is no more than apparent; what actually 
happens is the following: one starts by setting up a structure 
which fulfills part of the required relations, thereupon one tries to 
deduce from these relations, by means of tautologies, other 
relations, in such a way that these new relations, combined with 
those that have not yet been used, yield a system of conditions, 
suitable as a starting-point for the construction of the required 
structure. Only by this construction will it be proved that the 
original conditions can be fulfilled.” ([1907], p. 72).
However, he is not condemning the appeal to hypothetical 
constructions in general, but only the assumption that a 
mathematical construction can exist without us having first
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proved  that it could be effected and how. Moreover, he 
himself often referred to hypothetical constructions in his 
proof of negation and conditional statements (e.g. in his proof 
of the law of triple negation, [1981], p. 12).
Later Freudenthal [1937] and Griss [1946] criticized the 
use of hypothetical constructions especially in the cases where 
the supposed construction turns out to be impossible, as 
happens in a proof of a negation, if the proof is successful. 
This led Griss to the extreme position of trying to develop 
intuitionistic mathematics without using negation at all 
[1946], [1955].
Heyting [1937], [1961], on the contrary, defended the use of 
hypothetical constructions in mathematical reasoning:
“The following simple example shows that the problem A->B  in 
certain cases can be solved without a solution for the problem A  
being known. For A  I take the problem ‘find in the sequence of 
decimals of ;ra sequence 0123456789’, for B  the problem ‘find in 
the sequence of decimals of ^ a sequence 012345678’. Clearly B  can 
be reduced to A by a very simple construction.” ([1937], p. 117; the 
translation is from Troelstra and van Dalen [1988], p. 31).
As we shall see later in the thesis, the interpretations of 
the intuitionistic logical operators fall into two groups: those 
which make essential use of the notion of hypothetical
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construction and those which do not. In the former case the 
characterization of hypothetical constructions has to be taken 
seriously, in the sense that, for example, we must indicate 
recursively for each logical type of statement (conjunctions, 
disjunctions, etc) what is a proof of that statement which uses 
a hypothetical proof of a given premise.
In other words, that we should give a general characteriza­
tion of the notion of ‘proof from premises'. As we shall see at 
the time, the task of making this characterization is not 
entirely trivial.
Thus, by reducing the negation to an absurdity operator, 
and more in general, to the construction which shows that 
absurdity, the intuitionistic mathematician manages to assign 
a positive meaning to each negation statement, in accordance 
with the constructive philosophy of mathematics. An in­
tuitionistic negation is strictly speaking a positive claim -that 
which reduces the hypothetical construction to a basic 
impossibility such as ‘1=2'-, but it carries with it an implicit 
denial -the denial that we shall ever be able to perform the 
construction corresponding to the statement negated. More­
over, this will be obvious to anyone who understands the
absurdity of the basic impossibility in question -e.g. the 
absurdity of ‘1=2’.
1.1.8. The meaning of the conditional. Brouwer’s conception 
of the conditional in its strongest sense appears in his 
attempted proof of the bar theorem (e.g. in [1927], pp. 459- 
462; a neat exposition and discussion is Dummett [1977], pp. 
94-104). There, Brouwer considers a conditional statement 
(bar induction), classifies all possible proofs of the antecedent 
into three types, and tries to show that each of these proofs 
can be converted into a proof of the consequent.
This suggests that an intuitionistic proof of a conditional 
statement A-^B  is a method of transforming every proof of A  
into a proof of B.
An obvious question, however, is how can we know in 
advance which form any arbitrary proof of the antecedent 
should take, so that we ensure that our method will trans­
form all of them into proofs of the consequent. This question 
turns out to be a deep one.
We must notice that, in particular, as it happens Brouwer’s 
attempted proof of the bar theorem is incorrect, and no way
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has been found to correct it while preserving its original form 
(see again Dummett [1977], pp. 101-102).
In practice, most intuitionistic proofs of conditional 
statements appeal to only one obvious property that every 
proof of the antecedent must satisfy: to be a proof of the 
antecedent -that is, to have the antecedent as the final line or 
conclusion of the proof. The method then does not enter to 
transform the proofs of A  internally, but simply extends them 
to obtain proofs of B.
Brouwer himself, in other proofs of conditional statements 
returns to this simple procedure. For example, in his proof of 
the law of triple negation (e.g. [1981], p. 12), he first assumes 
-•“hA (that is, and then shows how we can transform
that construction into a proof of "iA  (that is, into a proof of 
A —»±), independently of any actual proof of the former. 
Moreover, every notable intuitionistic proof of a conditional 
statement has proceeded in a similar way as well (Dummett 
[1977], pp. 15 and 104).
1.1.9. Disjunction, conjunction and <->. From his discussion of 
the law of excluded middle we can see that in order to accept
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a disjunction Brouwer requires that one of the disjuncts is 
known to hold -or at least that a decision procedure is known 
which could be used to determine which one. This is some­
thing on which he insists many times. The following quote 
provides an illustration:
“Now consider the principium tertii exclusi: it claims that 
every supposition is either true or false; in mathematics this 
means that for every supposed imbedding of a system into another, 
satisfying certain given conditions, we can either accomplish such 
an imbedding by a construction, or we can arrive by a construction 
at the arrestment of the process which would lead to the imbed­
ding. It follows that the question of the validity of the principium 
tertii exclusi is equivalent to the question whether unsolvable 
mathematical problems can exist. There is not a shred of a proof 
for the conviction, which has sometimes been put forward that 
there exist no unsolvable mathematical problems.
“Insofar as only finite discrete systems are introduced, the 
investigation whether an imbedding is possible or not, can always 
be carried out and admits a definite result, so in this case the 
principium tertii exclusi is reliable as a principle of reasoning.” 
([1908], pp. 109).
However “in infinite systems the principium tertii exclusi is 
as yet not reliable” (p. 110).
In this way Brouwer succeeds in attaching a constructive 
meaning to disjunction statements: to assert a disjunction, the
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subject must be able to perform the constructions correspond­
ing to one of the disjunct s.
Conjunction shall not detain us long, neither here nor in 
the rest of the thesis. This is indeed, among the five logical 
operators, the only one which essentially does not change its 
meaning, except for the fact that it is now embedded in an 
intuitionistic language, and the other logical operators to 
which it relates are different from those of classical mathe­
matics.
For that matter, the biconditional is also defined as in 
classical logic -e.g. is an abbreviation of ‘(A—>B)/\ (B-+A)’.
This is not to say that intuitionistically ‘A<->B’ means the 
same as in classical logic, because again both (A —>B’ and *B-+A’ 
have changed their meaning with respect to classical logic.
Similarly, A a B ’ does not mean the same, because A  and B  
will have also changed their meaning with respect to their 
classical counterparts.
1.1.10. The quantifiers. Brouwer's conception of the exist­
ential quantifier is probably the most characteristic of all the 
logical operators. Intuitionistically mathematical objects are
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not assumed to exist by themselves, but only as a result of a 
generation or construction process. To prove that a certain 
entity satisfying a given condition exists, it is not enough, for 
example, to reduce the hypothesis that it did not exist to a 
contradiction: we must actually produce one, or at least show 
how it could be produced: “(•••) in intuitionist mathematics a 
mathematical entity is not necessarily predeterminate” 
([1955], p. 552). This means that 3 can no longer be read as 
‘there is’ in the classical sense -i.e. there exists independently 
of us-, but rather, as ‘we can construct’.
The following quote is an illustration:
“(...) now let us pass to infinite systems and ask for instance if 
there exists a natural number n such that in the decimal expan­
sion of n the nth, (n+l)th, (n+8)th, and (n+9)th digits form a 
sequence 0123456789. This question (...) can be answered neither 
affirmatively nor negatively. But then, from the intuitionist point 
of view, because outside human thought there are no mathemati­
cal truths, the assertion that in the decimal expansion of n a 
sequence 0123456789 either does or does not occur is devoid of 
sense.” ([1981], p. 6).
Finally, as for the universal quantifier, Brouwer’s require­
ment for a proof of a universal statement VxA(x) was that a 
method had been produced to establish A(c) for each element 
c in the domain. In particular it would not be enough, as
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before, to derive a contradiction from the hypothesis that an 
object d  such that “iA.(d) exists; that derivation would not be 
enough in general to prove A(c) of every individual c. Instead, 
he required an effective method -a construction- for doing 
exactly this.
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§1.2. Kolmogorov’s interpretation
1.2.1. An interpretation in terms of mathematical problems. 
Kolmogorov [1932] made the first attempt to give an explicit 
and systematic account of all the intuitionistic logical opera­
tors.
In this paper Kolmogorov outlines an interpretation which 
is patently verificationist. He argues that it would be a 
mistake to try to give an interpretation of intuitionistic logic 
based on the notion o f‘truth'; instead, he proposes the notions 
of ‘problem' and ‘solution to a problem':
“In addition to theoretical logic, which systematizes a proof 
schemata for theoretical truths, one can systematize a proof 
schemata for solutions to problems (...).
“(...) In the second section, assuming the basic intuitionistic 
principles, intuitionistic logic is subjected to a critical study; it is 
thus shown that it must be replaced by the calculus of problems, 
since its objects in reality are problems, rather than theoretical 
propositions.” (p. 58*).
* My translation. “Neben der theoretischen Logik, welche die Be- 
weisschemata der theoretischen Wahrheiten systematisiert, kann man 
die Schemata der Losungen von Aufgaben (...) systematisieren.
“(...) Im zweiten Paragraphen wird, unter Anerkennung der allgemei- 
nen intuitionistischen Voraussetzungen, die intuitionistische Logik 
kritisch untersucht; es wird dabei gezeigt, daJ3 sie durch die Auf- 
gabenrechnung ersetzt werden sollte, denn ihre Objekte sind in 
Wirklichkeit keine theoretischen Aussagen, sondern vielmehr Auf-
61
As we shall see immediately, Kolmogorov defines what is 
to be the solution of a complex problem in terms of solutions 
of its logical components, depending on what the main logical 
operator is. By doing this he establishes the general form of 
the verificationist interpretation: an inductive compositional 
definition of the notion of ‘solution to a problem’; later 
versions shall use the concept of ‘proof’ rather than that of 
‘solutions to problems’, but this is only a terminological 
difference. Also, in so doing, Kolmogorov is giving the first 
general definition of the concept of ‘constructive proof’, 
-although, again, he does not present it under this title.
1.2.2. Kolmogorov and Heyting. Kolmogorov was anticipated 
in several respects by Heyting [1930] and [1931]. In par­
ticular, in those papers Heyting also outlines the essence of 
the verificationist interpretation and uses it to explain the 
intuitionistic use of negation and disjunction.
However, Kolmogorov’s work was independent. Indeed, at 
the end of the paper he includes a footnote, added at the 
proof-reading stage, in which he credits the similarity
gaben”.
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between his interpretation and that of Heyting [1931], which 
had appeared recently: “this interpretation of intuitionistic 
logic is intimately related to the ideas that Mr Heyting has 
advanced in the latest volume of Erkenntnis (...)” (p. 65, 
footnote 17*).
Heyting, on the other hand, in [1934] acknowledges the 
independence -as well as the similarity- of Kolmogorov’s 
interpretation in terms of problems, and adopts it himself to 
explain the meaning of the intuitionistic logical constants and 
to give semantic motivation to several logical theorems (pp. 
17-23).
1.2.3. The interpretation of the connectives. Kolmogorov’s 
interpretation of the connectives is as follows. Let A  and B  be 
mathematical problems, then:
(a) A a B  is “the problem of solving both A  and S ”;
(b) A vB  is “the problem of solving at least one of A  and B ”;
“Diese Interpretation der intuitionistischen Logik h&ngt eng 
zusammen mit den Ideen, welche Herr Heyting im letzten Bande der 
‘Erkenntnis’ (...)”.
(c) A — is “the problem of solving B  supposing that the solu­
tion to A  is given”; and finally
(d) iA  is “the problem of obtaining a contradiction supposing 
that the solution to A  is given” (pp. 59-60*).
With respect to the conditional, Kolmogorov explains: “or, 
what amounts to the same, ‘to carry the solution of B  back to 
the solution of A '” (p. 59**). That is, what he has in mind is 
a partial solution or solution-schema of B, which would 
become a full solution if complemented with a solution of A. 
In other words: a solution of B with premise A.
This implies the appeal to a hypothetical proof of A. On the 
other hand, negation stands exactly in the same situation. In 
fact, a negation statement “A  appears as a special kind of 
conditional statement, A—>B, in a case where B  is a contradict­
* “Wenn a und b zwei Aufgaben sind, bezeichnet <z a &  die Aufgabe 
‘beide Aufgaben a und b Ibsen’, warhend av6 die Aufgabe bezeichnet 
‘mindestens eine der Aufgaben a  und b losen’. Weiter ist az>6 die 
Aufgabe ‘vorausgesetzt, daB die Losung von a gegeben ist, b losen’ (...).
“(...) Dementsprechend bezeichnet “>a die Aufgabe Vorausgesetzt, daB 
die Losung von a  gegeben ist, einen Widerspruch erhalten’ ”.
** “(...) oder, was dasselbe bedeutet, ‘die Losung von b auf die Lbsung 
von a  zuruckzufuhren’ ”.
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ion. Kolmogorov does not explain, however, what he under­
stands by ‘contradiction' (Widerspruch).
1.2.4. The interpretation of the quantifiers. Kolmogorov seems 
more concerned with the interpretation of intuitionistic 
propositional logic than with predicate logic -in fact, the 
‘calculus of problems' he gives contains propositional axioms 
only (pp. 61-62). However, after explaining the connectives he 
extends his interpretation in terms of problems to the 
universal quantifier:
“Generally speaking, if x is a variable (of the type desired) and 
A(x) is a problem whose meaning depends on the variable x, VxA(x) 
is the problem ‘to indicate a general method for the solution of A(x) 
for each particular value of x \  This should be understood like this: 
to solve the problem VxA(x) means to be in a position to solve the 
problem A(c) for each given value c of x, after a series of steps 
given in advance (before the choice of c ) ( p .  60*).
* “Im allgemeinen bedeutet, wenn x eine Variable (von beliebiger 
Art) ist und a(x) eine Aufgabe bezeichnet, deren Sinn von dem Werte 
von x abhangt, (x)a(x) die Aufgabe ‘eine allgemeine Methode ftir die 
Lbsung von a{x) bei jedem einzelnen Wert von x anzugeben\ Mann soil 
dies so verstehen: Die Aufgabe (x)a(x) zu losen, bedeutet, imstande sein, 
fur jeden gegebenen Einzelwert x0 von x die Aufgabe a(x0) nach einer 
endlichen Reihe von im voraus (schon vor der Wahl won jc0) bekannten 
Schritten zu Ibsen.”
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This does not need any comment -at least for the time being.
After giving the interpretation of V, Kolmogorov does not 
also give the interpretation of the existential quantifier, as we 
would expect; but elsewhere in the paper he gives ample 
explanations on the meaning of existential claims in in­
tuitionistic mathematics -and in particular, to the central 
point concerning them: that the person who makes the claim 
must be able to indicate a particular instance of it.
In any case it is very easy to apply the preceding definition 
to the intuitionistic 3, thus -with A(x) as before:
the solution to 3xA{x) is the indication of a particular object 
c plus a solution to A(c).
Heyting, for example, in his exposition of Kolmogorov’s 
interpretation, includes basically this definition of 3 as a 
straightforward extension of the definition ([1934], p. 21).
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§1.3. Heyting’s interpretation
1.3.1. Introduction. Heyting’s interpretation in its standard 
form does not appear until [1956]. It is in this book that we 
first find his own systematic explanation of all the intuition­
istic logical operators, entirely based on the notions of ‘proof' 
and ‘assertability conditions'.
The basics of this definition, however, are already clear in 
[1930], [1931] and [1934]. In those works Heyting openly 
defends the verificationist point of view, uses it to define 
several connectives, and comments positively on the variant 
of Kolmogorov.
1.3.2. The verificationist point of view. Heyting's defence of 
verificationism departs from the constructive standpoint:
“Here is thus an important result of the intuitionistic critique: 
the idea of an existence of the mathematical entities outside our 
mind should not enter into the demonstrations. I think that even 
the realists, while continuing to believe in the transcendent 
existence of mathematical entities, should recognize the impor­
tance of knowing in what way mathematics can be built without 
using this idea.
“For the intuitionists mathematics constitutes a magnificent 
edifice built by human reason. Perhaps they would do better to 
avoid entirely the word ‘to exist’; if they continue to use it
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nevertheless, it could not have, for them, any other sense than this 
of ‘having been built by reason’.” ([1930], p. 958*).
Consequently, mathematical statements have to be inter­
preted in a non-realist way:
“A mathematical proposition expresses a certain expectation. 
For example, the proposition, ‘Euler’s constant E  is rational’, 
expresses the expectation that we could find two integers n and m  
such that E=nlm. Perhaps the word ‘intention’, coined by the 
phenomenologists, expresses even better what is meant here.” 
([1931], p. 58).
“There is a criterion by which we are able to recognize mathe­
matical assertions as such. Every mathematical assertion can be 
expressed in the form: ‘I have effected the construction A  in my 
mind’.” ([1956], pp. 18-19).
These explanations seem to support the operational 
interpretation. However, Heyting makes it quite clear that,
* My translation. “Voici done un resultat important de la critique 
intuitionniste: L’idee d ’une existence hors de notre esprit des entites 
mathematiques ne doit pas entrer dans le demostrations. Je crois que 
meme les realistes, tout en continuant de croire k l’existence transcen- 
dante des entites mathematiques, doivent reconnaitre l’importance de 
la question de savoir comment les mathematiques s’edifient sans l’usage 
de cette idee.
Pour les intuitionnistes les mathematiques constituent un edifice 
grandiose construit par la raison humaine. Peut-etre feraient-ils mieux 
d’eviter tout a fait le mot «exister»; s’ils continuent neanmoins a 
l’employer, il ne saurait avoir pour eux d’autre sens que celui d’ «etre 
construit par la raison» ”.
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for him, to effect the construction required by a mathematical 
statement and to give a proof of it are one and the same 
thing:
“The demonstration of a proposition consists in the realization 
of the construction that it requires.” ([1934], p. 17*).
“(...) a mathematical proposition A  always demands a mathe­
matical construction with certain given properties; it can be 
asserted as soon as such a construction has been carried out. We 
say in this case that the construction proves the proposition A  and 
call it a proof of A ” ([1956], p. 98).
“(...) every mathematical theorem is the expression of a result 
of a successful construction. The proof of the theorem consists in 
this construction itself, and the steps of the proof are the same as 
the steps of the mathematical construction.” ([1958], p. 107).
As I have said before this identification is probably incorrect, 
but I shall not give a detailed argument until later.
The way in which he defines the same connective at 
different places confirms this identification too; for example: 
“A vB  signifies that intention which is fulfilled if and only if 
at least one of the intentions A  and B  is fulfilled”, and “A vB
* I translate this text from the French 1955 expanded edition, which 
is the only one I could find in London. However, this and the following 
quotes belonged to the original German 1934 edition -the 1955 additions 
to the original text are clearly marked in the French version.
“La demonstration d’une proposition consiste dans la realisation de 
la construction qu’elle exige.”
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can be asserted if and only if at least one of the propositions 
A  and B  can be asserted” ([1931], p. 59 and [1956], p. 97 
respectively).
1.3.3. Heyting and Kolmogorov. On the other hand, as we 
know Heyting also acknowledges the similarity between the 
proof interpretation and Kolmogorov’s. As I said before, in 
[1934] he uses consistently Kolmogorov’s interpretation to 
motivate the intuitionistic rejection of various classical logical 
principles and the acceptance of others. Before doing that he 
writes:
“Kolmogorov (...) has proposed a similar conception (...). He 
interprets this calculus as a calculus of problems. (...) he does not 
explicate this concept, which we could interpret as the request to 
effect a mathematical construction which satisfies certain condi­
tions.” ([1934], p. 17*).
Indeed, earlier in [1930] he had written:
* “Kolmogoroff (...) a propose une conception voisine (...). II interpr^te 
ce calcul comme un calcul de probl&mes. (...) il n’explicite pas ce concept, 
qu’on peut interpreter comme la demande d’effectuer une construction 
mathematique qui satisfasse a certaines conditions.”
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“A proposition (...) expresses a problem, or even better a certain 
expectation (...)”. (p. 958*).
Later in [1958] he will insist:
‘The older interpretations by Kolmogorov (as a calculus of 
problems) and Heyting (as a calculus of intended constructions) 
were substantially equivalent.” (p. 107).
1.3.4. The interpretation of the connectives. In any case, in 
[1956] Heyting takes the concept of ‘provability’ (or ‘asserta- 
bility conditions’) as the basic notion of the whole definition 
as so will do most authors afterwards:
“It will be necessary to fix, as firmly as possible, the meaning of 
the logical connectives; I do this by giving necessary and sufficient 
conditions under which a complex expression can be asserted.” 
([1956], p. 97).
It is in these terms then that he gives the interpretation of 
the connectives, as follows:
(a) “A a B  can be asserted if and only if both A  and B  can be 
asserted”;
(b) “A vB  can be asserted if and only if at least one of the 
propositions A  and B  can be asserted”;
* “Une proposition (...) exprime un problkme, ou mieux encore une 
certaine attente (...).”
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(c) “~vl can be asserted if and only if we possess a construct­
ion which, from the supposition that a construction A  were 
carried out, leads to a contradiction”; and
(d) “A —>B can be asserted, if and only if we possess a construc­
tion c, which, joined to any construction proving A  (supposing 
that the latter be effected), would automatically effect a 
construction proving B ” ([1956], pp. 97-98).
The definitions of a  and v  do not deserve any special com­
ment. In the definition of -> it is to be noticed that Heyting 
writes “which, joined to...”. That is: he is not considering -at 
least apparently- the possibility that the construction in 
question operates internal transformations on the proofs of A. 
He rather refers to a simple juxtaposition; and his other 
formulations of the same clause are sometimes less specific, 
but similar -e.g. “A—»B then represents the intention of a cons­
truction which, from each demonstration of A, leads to a 
demonstration of B ” ([1934], p. 17*).
* “az>& represente alors l’intention d’une construction qui, de chaque 
demonstration pour a, conduit a une demonstration pour 6”.
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1.3.5. The conditional and negation. On the other hand, this 
clause (d) refers to a construction which as a m atter of fact, 
if joined to a construction proving the antecedent (A) would 
effect the consequent (5). We could paraphrase it as ‘a 
construction c such that, for any construction d, if d  proves A  
then c(d) proves B \  Hence the reference to hypothetical 
constructions is not essential -we shall see along §2.6 that 
this makes a non-trivial difference-; and the formulation of 
[1934] just mentioned also agrees with clause (d) in 1.3.4.
On the other hand, this definition puts no bound to the 
proofs of A  referred to -e.g. to their complexity or otherwise. 
This means that among the proofs considered there might be 
some which have been built up from c itself. In other words: 
this clause is impredicative -self-reflexive.
In contrast, the definition of "* appeals explicitly to a proof 
of a contradiction from premise A, that is: a hypothetical 
proof of a contradiction which would use as a premise the 
existence, hypothetical as well, of a construction proving A. In 
addition, other definitions of negation that Heyting gives in 
different places are also of this form -e.g. “the proposition ‘E  
is not rational', (...) signifies the expectation that one can
derive a contradiction from the assumption that E  is rational” 
([1931], p. 59).
This means that there is a difference between Heyting’s 
definitions of -> and a subtle difference but an important 
one, as I have pointed out before and I shall explain in detail 
later. The definition of ”• uses the notion of ‘proof from 
premises’ -and hence the notion of hypothetical proof- and in 
this sense is similar to Kolmogorov’s. The definition of — on 
the other hand, merely requires a construction by means of 
which it is possible to produce an actual proof of the con­
sequent provided that we possess a proof of the antecedent.
Finally, Heyting spells out his idea of a contradiction 
briefly:
“I think that contradiction must be taken as a primitive notion.
It seems very difficult to reduce it to simpler notions, and it is 
always easy to recognize a contradiction as such. In practically all 
cases it can be brought into the form 1=2.” ([1956], p. 98).
1.3.6. The interpretation of the quantifiers. Heyting’s inter­
pretation of the quantifiers is as follows:
(a) “ |— \fxA{x) means that A(x) is true for every x in 9) [the
domain]; in other words, we possess a general method of
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construction which, if any element c of 2  is chosen, yields by
specialization the construction A(c)”; and
(b) “3xA(x) will be true if and only if an element c of 2  for
which A(c) is true has actually been constructed” ([1956], p. 
102).
It is remarkable that in the latter clause Heyting does only 
require that an instance of A(x) is produced, but not that it is 
shown  to be such an instance -in general this will not be 
evident, and will ask for a separate proof.
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§1.4. Gentzen’s natural deduction rules
1.4.1. Introduction. When Gentzen presented his natural 
deduction calculus, and in particular the intuitionistic 
version, he wrote that “the introductions [the introduction 
rules] represent, as it were, the ‘definitions’ of the symbols 
concerned, and the eliminations are no more, in the final 
analysis, than the consequences of these definitions” ([1935], 
p. 80). Indeed, he had intended to create a formal system  
which came as close as possible to actual mathematical 
reasoning (p. 74); hence the way in which the rules governing 
each logical constant were given -and in particular, the intro­
duction rules- would have to be immediately connected with 
its intuitive meanings.
1.4.2. Gentzens introduction rules. Gentzen’s rules are well- 
known. According to them:
(a) a proof of A a B  is given by a proof of A  plus a proof of B ;
(b) a proof of A vB  is given either by a proof of A or by a proof 
of B ;
(c) a proof of A —>B is a proof of B  from premise A ;
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(d) a proof of ~*A is a proof of A->J_, where _L is any false 
statement;
(e) a proof of \/xA(x) is a proof of A(y) for a critical variable y  
which does not occur in \fxA(x) or in any non-discharged 
premise;
(f) a proof of 3xA(x) is a proof of A(t) for some term t ([1935], 
pp. 77-79).
1.4.3. Discussion. Gentzen’s contribution is important even if 
his main concern was not that of giving a semantic explana­
tion, because he makes a clear and explicit use of the notion 
of ‘proof from premises’ to define both negation and the 
conditional, and introduces a definition of the universal 
quantifier somehow connected to it: the definition in terms of 
‘proofs with free variables’, which has later been adopted by 
a number of authors, and which I shall thoroughly examine 
later in the thesis.
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§1.5. Kreisel’s interpretation
1,5.1. Introduction. Kreisel [1962] made the first attempt to
make the previous informal explanations of the logical
constants fully rigorous. Kreisel acknowledges that Heyting’s
interpretation is basically sufficient to convey the meaning of
the logical constants, but he argues that from the technical
point of view it would be desirable to make the definition
more precise (p. 199).
Kreisel completes the definition with the specification of an
atomic case, introduces a uniform notation for all the clauses,
and modifies the definitions of —» and V in a way which is
going to be slightly controversial.
Kreisel’s interpretation is clearly verificationist:
“The Intuitionistic Position (General Statement):
“The sense of a mathematical assertion denoted by a linguistic 
object A  is intuitionistically determined (or understood) if we have 
laid down what constructions constitute a proof of A ” ([1962], p. 
201).
Indeed, the project is closely connected with the formulation 
of an ‘abstract theory of constructions’, in which the two most 
basic notions of intuitionistic mathematics -‘construction’ and 
‘constructive proof’- would receive a systematic treatment (p.
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198); as I said at the beginning I shall not be concerned here 
with the details of this theory or of its later developments, 
which are numerous.
1.5.2. K reisels definition. For the interpretation of an atomic 
statement P(cv ...,c2) over a universe i^it is enough to indicate
a set -a species- of n-tuples of 3) plus a series of objects
a1,...,ane&. As I remarked in 0.6.2, intuitionistically a set has
to be presented by means of a definite condition of which we 
know how to recognize a proof that it applies to a given 
object.
Hence for an atomic statement to be intuitionistically 
acceptable its proof-conditions have to be laid down in 
advance, and by doing that we also fix its constructive 
meaning.
Then Kreisel gives separate clauses for each complex 
statement depending on which is its main logical operator. He 
uses a very compact notation -taken from the theory of 
constructions-, which I shall translate to more informal terms 
as usual:
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(a) c is a proof of A a B when it is a pair (c1?c2) such that cx is 
a proof of A  and c2 is a proof of B ;
(b) c is a proof A vB  when it is either a proof of A  or of B ;
(c) c is a proof of when it is a pair (Cj,c2) such that cx 
proves that for any construction d, if d  proves A , then c2(d) 
proves B;
(d) c is a proof of “iA  when it is a pair (cvc2) such that cx 
proves that for any construction d, if d  proves A, then c2(d) 
proves 1=0;
(e) c is a proof of 3xA(x) when it is a pair (Cj,c2) such that 
proves A(cJ;
(f) c is a proof of \/xA(x) when it is a pair (cvc2) such that c1 
proves that for any construction d, c2(d) proves Aid) ([1962], 
p. 205).
1.5.3. Discussion. The constructions in the definition can be 
objects (functions of zero arguments), or genuine functions, 
which operate on other objects and functions. No type 
distinction is made explicit between them (p. 202). The 
application of one construction to another is understood in 
the usual way except that in the cases where it does not make
sense it is given an artificial value so as to ensure that it is 
always defined: in those cases c(d) is taken to be c itself.
In the case of the construction c2 of clause (c), its role is to 
transform any possible construction which is a proof of A  into 
a proof of B. Hence the clause involves a quantification over 
all constructions and, in particular, over all possible proofs of 
A , so it is impredicative as happened with Heyting’s clause; 
and exactly the same is true here for clause (d).
In this case, however, internal transformations of the 
proofs of A  are allowed.
1.5A. The decidability of the proof relation. In contrast with 
Heyting’s interpretation, the constructions corresponding to 
i  and V are here pairs of constructions. In the case of a 
proof of A-+B, for example, c2 plays the role of transforming all 
proofs of A  into proofs of B ; but in general it will not be 
evident whether or not it does this, and so c2 is to provide an 
argument which proves that c2 indeed works as required.
The idea of these ‘extra-clauses’ was first suggested by 
Kreisel in [1961], footnote 4, p. 107. Later he shall call the 
corresponding construction c1 in each clause a ‘judgement
81
proof', since its purpose is to ‘judge' that the other construct­
ion works as expected ([1971], p. 129 and note 11, p. 146). In 
turn, we could call the second construction the ‘working 
proof’, since it is this that performs the essential task of the 
proof in question.
As a result the proof-relation induced by the definition is 
a decidable relation: if it is not obvious that c2 works as 
required then c1 will prove it so. The decidability of the proof- 
relation is important for Kreisel:
“(...) we are adopting the basic intuitionistic idealization that we 
can recognize a proof when we see one, and so rA [the proof- 
predicate for a statement A] is decidable.” ([1962], p. 202).
Later he shall call this assumption a ‘fundamental principle' 
([1965], p. 124), and writes:
“This principle is embodied in the usual formal systems where, 
for any particular (representation of a proof by a) sequence of 
symbols, it can be decided whether it proves (the assertion 
expressed by) any given formula. In addition, formal systems 
require the decision (i) to be mechanical, and (ii) for arbitrary 
formulae (not only universal ones).” (p. 124).
Also Dummett [1977], for example, adheres to this idea:
“The explanation of each constant must be faithful to the 
principle that, for any construction that is presented to us, we 
shall always be able to recognize effectively whether or not it is a 
proof of any given statement.” (p. 12)
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Finally, it is to be noticed that the clause for v  has been 
later modified by several authors (starting with Kreisel 
himself in [1965], p. 129), as to include an indication of which 
disjunct is the one being proved; for example, by requiring 
that a proof of A vB  be a pair (cvc2) such that either cl proves 
A  and then c2=0, or c1 proves B  and then c2= l.
This modification, however, is unnecessary if, as it happens 
here, the proof relation is ensured to be decidable with 
respect to the other clauses. In particular, if cx proves A  or cx 
proves B  then we already know how to check which one is the 
case, and we do not need an indicator of it. This point is made 
by Dummett [1977] (p. 320) -Heilman [1984] also mentions a 
lecture by Scott Weinstein in 1977 in which he makes this 
observation too.
1.5.5. The debate on the extra-clauses. The addition of the 
extra-clauses has the effect of destroying the inductive 
structure of the definition. Indeed, if the definition is to be 
inductive, then, as I explained at the beginning, the ascription 
of meaning to a compound statement would have to be given
83
in terms of the ascription of meaning to statements of smaller 
complexity.
In this case, the definition of proof of a complex statement 
would have to be done in terms of proofs of statements 
logically simpler than it; but this requirement is broken by 
Kreisel’s extra-clause, since it appeals to a proof of a very 
general fact: that for any construction d , c2{d) proves the 
corresponding statement. Naturally this does not fall under 
the scope of the inductive definition.
During the years following Kreisel’s introduction of the 
extra-clauses they were naturally adopted by most authors, as 
a plain improvement over the preceding interpretations. 
Examples are -apart from Kreisel himself- Troelstra ([1969], 
[1977]), Nicolas Goodman ([1970]), van Dalen ([1973], [1979]), 
Dummett ([1977], p. 399) and Bell and Machover ([1977], pp. 
406-407).
Troelstra [1977] and [1981] introduced the abbreviation 
‘BHK’ for ‘Brouwer-Heyting-Kreisel’ to denote the intended 
explanations of the logical constants.
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However, others remained reluctant to include the extra­
clauses in the definition. Scott [1970] argues that we should 
distinguish between constructions and proofs:
“We have no abstract proofs only constructions and species of 
constructions. When the author finally obtained his formalism the 
proofs-as-objects vanished.” (p. 241)
“Assuming for simplicity that no hypothesis of declarations are 
required, what must be done in order to establish A-»P? One must 
produce a construction together with a proof that this construction 
transforms every construction that could establish A  into a 
construction for B.
“The construction is an object of the theory [the theory of 
constructions] while the proof is an elementary argument about 
the theory. Kreisel calls such proofs ‘judgements’ and asks for an 
abstract theory of them. We have not provided this because we did 
not see why such a theory was needed.” (pp. 261-262).
Then, to convey the meaning, for instance, of the conditional, 
one would need to refer to constructions only. However, in a 
note at the end of the paper he declares having been con­
vinced by Kreisel and Godel in conversation of the need for 
decidability and abstract proofs, and almost withdraws the 
theory (Postscript, p. 272).
Prawitz [1977] considered that the addition of Kreisel’s 
extra-clauses is untenable:
“In the cases when A  is an implication or a universal sentence 
(...) we must require not only a construction or a description of an
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appropriate procedure but also an understanding of this procedure. 
The knowledge required in this case is thus of a considerably more 
involved character. One may ask whether this knowledge should 
not consist of a description of the procedure together with a proof 
that this procedure has the property required, as suggested 
originally by Kreisel. But this would lead to an infinite regress and 
would defeat the whole project of a theory of meaning as discussed 
here.” (p. 27).
Prawitz is wrong -I think- that Kreisel’s extra-clauses lead to 
an infinite regress, because the judgement construction, being 
a proof, must include everything that is needed to ensure that 
the other construction works as required; it cannot be that a 
second judgement proof to ‘judge’ c1 is needed, because if cx is 
not enough to show that c2 works as required then this will 
mean that cY is not adequate as a judgement proof.
However, he is probably right about the impossibility of 
basing a theory of meaning on a non-inductive definition.
1.5.6. More on the debate. Later other papers such as Sund- 
holm [1983] and Weinstein [1983] appeared exploring the 
costs of adopting the extra-clauses. For example Weinstein 
writes:
“It is evident that the new clauses [Kreisel’s extra-clauses] for 
the conditional and universal quantifier taken together with the
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old clauses for the atomic formulas and the remaining connectives 
can no longer be viewed as an inductive definition (...).
“This means of securing the decidability of the proof conditions 
for formulas of arithmetic is not without cost.” (p. 264).
Sundholm [1983] (p. 161) quotes one of Heyting’s later 
publications, [1974], p. 87, and notices that Heyting did not 
adopt the extra-clauses in his own explanations of —> and V. To 
this we could add that Heyting maintained the original 
formulations in the further revised editions of [1956], in 1966 
and 1971. More particularly, Sundholm says that Heyting 
mentioned the extra-clauses in [1968] (p. 318), but only in the 
process of a survey of recent work within intuitionism in 
which he describes Kreisel’s contributions of [1962] and 
[1965]. Finally, Sundholm also refers to the fact that Troels­
tra, in conversation, stressed to him that it would not be fair 
to assume that Heyting was against the introduction of the 
extra-clauses from the fact that they never appeared in his 
work (footnote 13, p. 169).
Later we shall see more about Sundholm and this debate, 
but the thing is that as a result of it, some of the authors who 
had happily welcomed the extra-clauses became sceptical
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about them. Van Dalen [1983] (p. 166), [1986] (p. 231), gives 
definitions without them, and writes:
“It must be pointed out however that the decidability of the 
proof-relations has been criticized and the ‘extra clauses’ are not 
universally accepted.” ([1986], p. 232).
In Troelstra and van Dalen [1988], they give an explana­
tion of the logical constants without the extra-clauses (p. 9), 
and write: “Kreisel proposed this version [the one with 
judgement proofs] in the hope of obtaining interesting new 
models for intuitionistic systems, but this hope was not 
fulfilled” (p. 32). Ironically, here they again use the abbrevia­
tion ‘BHK’ but this time standing for ‘Brouwer-Heyting-Kol- 
mogorov’; later, other authors continued to use this abbrevia­
tion with the first sense, e.g. Ruitenburg [1991] (p. 156) or 
Heilman [1989] (p. 50) -although it is not clear that the latter 
is well informed about Kreisel’s extra-clauses since in his 
discussion of the decidability of the proof relation on pp. 57-59 
he ignores them completely.
1.5.7. The naive verificationist interpretation. The inter­
pretation which I shall call here ‘the naive interpretation' is 
what results from Kreisel’s interpretation after we remove
the extra-clauses. With minor changes, it can be found in van 
Dalen [1983] (p. 166), [1986] (p. 231) and Troelstra and van 
Dalen [1988] (p. 9), although there might be earlier versions. 
It does not coincide, however, with Kolmogorov's, Heyting's or 
Gentzen’s.
It goes as follows:
(a) a proof of AajB is a proof of A  plus a proof of B;
(b) a proof of A vB  is either a proof of A or a proof of B;
(c) a proof of A->B  is a construction which transforms every 
proof of A  into a proof of B;
(d) a proof of ~iA is a construction which transforms every 
proof of A  into a proof of some absurd statement ±;
(e) a proof of 3xA(x) is a construction c plus a proof of A(c);
(f) a proof of \fxA(x) is a construction which transforms every 
construction c in the domain into a proof of A(c).
This definition does not coincide with Heyting’s for several 
reasons: the definition of —> appeals to transformations of the 
proofs of A in general, and not simply to juxtaposition  of other 
constructions to them as Heyting did. Hence the full power of 
Brouwer's conditional is here recaptured. Moreover, the 
definition of “»is different, since, as we saw, Heyting appeals
to proofs from premises. Finally, the definition of 3 is also 
different, since Heyting only required a construction c which 
satisfies the condition -that is, a construction c such that A(c) 
holds- but not a proof that c is such a construction.
The difference with Kolmogorov’s and Gentzen’s interpreta­
tion is even more obvious, because the appeal to proofs from 
premises here is totally absent -as we shall see in §2.6 this 
makes a non-trivial difference.
This interpretation is untenable unless we replace its 
central concept -‘proof’- by a different one, and that is why I 
have called it ‘naive’; but this is something the discussion of 
which I shall postpone for the next chapter. In any case, this 
could not constitute a problem for the works in which the 
definitions appears, since in those works it does not play a 
technical role proper, but stands mainly as a heuristic guide.
1.5.8. Other considerations. Another consequence of the 
decidability of the proof relation achieved with the addition 
of the extra-clauses is that the meta-connectives that are used 
in the definition can be taken to be the classical ones -that is, 
the truth-functions-, since in the context of decidable state-
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ments the intuitionistic and classical propositional connect­
ives behave exactly in the same way.
This is very important for Kreisel:
“If the logical operations, in terms of which the usual assertions 
are built up, are not primitive but explained, then the basic proofs 
must be proofs of special assertions in which the (problematic) 
logical operations are not involved.” ([1965], p. 123).
The same point is also made by Nicolas Goodman:
“If the definition is not to be circular, then the ‘i f ..., then’ in the 
definition must be essentially simpler than the intuitionistic 
implication being defined. This is achieved by requiring that the 
proof predicates (...) be decidable, so that, even from an intuition­
istic point of view, we can make unproblematic use of the truth- 
functional connectives.” ([1970], p. 105).
However, this point loses its force if we consider that a 
similar reduction is not possible in the case of the quantifiers 
-whether we take the proof relation to be decidable or not, the 
meta-quantifiers used in the clauses must be the intuitionistic 
ones.
The fact that the semantic definition of the intuitionistic 
logical operators has to use these very operators in the 
metalanguage need not be more worrisome here than in the 
classical case, where exactly the same thing occurs. As 
Prawitz writes:
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“(...) in one sense we already know what is to count as a proof 
and what it is to grasp the meaning of an expression. That is, in 
practice, we are able to tell whether something is a proof and 
whether somebody has grasped the meaning of a given expression. 
What semantics and logic have to do is to explain this practice by 
giving a systematic account of it, and by doing this, our implicit 
knowledge may be improved and become explicit to some extent 
(although it seems that the explanation will usually still have to 
presuppose some implicit knowledge of the same kind).” ([1979], 
pp. 26-27).
This systematic account consists precisely in giving the 
interpretation of each logical constant by specifying what the 
meaning of each compound statement in terms of the meaning 
of its constituents is.
Finally, another point which deserves to be mentioned is 
that, as Goodman [1970] pointed out, if the proof relation is 
assumed to be decidable then the impredicativity of —> can lead 
to a paradox in the theory of constructions.
The paradox arises from the production of a sentence which 
basically asserts of itself that it is unprovable; then, using the 
decidability of the proof relation it is possible to construct a 
proof of that sentence, leading to a paradox. Goodman 
acknowledges in his paper (p. 109) that the paradox had also 
been derived independently by Kreisel, and so it has been
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called the ‘Kreisel-Goodman paradox’ (e.g. in Weinstein 
[1983], p. 264). I shall not analyze this paradox here, as it 
does not have any direct relation to our problem. However, it 
is one of the motivations for the stratification of the universe 
of constructions into levels, that we shall see later.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE SEARCH FOR THE INTENDED 
INTERPRETATION: DISCUSSION
§2.1. The decidability of the proof relation
2.1.1. A  fundamental dichotomy in intuitionistic mathematics. 
At the heart of intuitionistic mathematics, there lies a 
fundamental dichotomy: the difference between having a 
mathematical construction which performs a certain task and 
knowing that it does perform such a task. Very often it is 
obvious that our construction does the work required, but not 
always. Sometimes it is difficult to verify, and sometimes 
-perhaps- even impossible.
This dichotomy leads to two different ways of interpreting 
intuitionistic logic and mathematics depending on which of 
the two following assumptions is adopted:
(a) the meaning of a statement is simply that we can perform 
a certain construction; or
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(b) the meaning of a statement is that we can perform a 
certain construction and  prove that it has the desired 
properties -i.e. that it works as required.
It is easy to see that they lead, respectively, to the opera­
tional and the verificationist interpretation of the logical 
constants, the latter with  Kreisel’s judgement proofs, of 
course.
The second interpretation is obviously ‘more constructive’ 
than the first, although they seem to induce exactly the same 
system of predicate logic -Heyting’s- and hence also the same 
relation of logical consequence. This is not too surprising if we 
consider that if one construction implies another -or can be 
easily transformed into another- then a proof that it works as 
required will normally imply that the other construction also 
works as required -that is, the first proof should be easy to 
transform into the second.
I shall now give a few examples which illustrate to what 
extent it might not be obvious that a given construction works 
as expected.
95
2.1.2. A  trivial case. A case where the verification is trivial is 
the following.
Theorem (Euclid). There are infinitely many prime num­
bers.
Proof. Constructively, we must produce a construction 
which, when applied to each n e N  yields a number p  which is 
prime and bigger than n.
Construction. Let n be any natural number. Calculate n \+1 
and take the smallest divisor p  of that number which is 
greater than 1 (if there is no other, n!+1 itself).
Verification that our construction works as required. 
Obvious: p  must be prime since otherwise it would have 
smaller divisors which would also divide nl+1; and it must be 
bigger than n, since otherwise nllp would be a whole number 
and hence 1 Ip would have to be a whole number too.
2.1.3. A  less trivial case. A case where the verification is less 
trivial results after a small specialization on the preceding 
result.
Theorem  (Dirichlet). There are infinitely many prime num­
bers of the form  4/ra-l for some m eN.
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For m>0, 4 /n -l = 4(/n-l)+3. Hence it follows at once that 
there are infinitely many primes of the form 4/n+3. A special 
case of Dirichlet’s theorem.
Proof. To establish this classically it would be enough to 
assume that the prime numbers of the form 4/72-1 are finite 
and then derive a contradiction (e.g. Long [1987], p. 73). 
Constructively we must, however -as before-, produce a 
construction which transforms every natural number n into 
another p, which is bigger and of the required form.
Construction. Let n be any natural number. Calculate 4n!-l 
and then take the smallest divisor of that number which is of 
the form 4/n -l (if there is no other, 4/21-1 itself). Let p  be the 
resulting number.
Verification that our construction works as required, p  is 
obviously of the form 4/n-l. Also, since p  divides 4n!-l exactly 
it is plain that p>n ; otherwise 4n!/p would be a whole number 
and Up would have to be whole too; but p  is of the form 
4/n-l, so it cannot be 1.
To see that p  is prime, suppose that it were composite and 
let p v ..., p k be its prime factors. Then we reason as follows.
Every natural number is uniquely of one the forms:
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4 m,
4/n+l,
4/n+2, or 
4m+3
(m being the quotient and 0, 1, 2 and 3 respectively, the 
remainder of the division of that number by 4).
Furthermore, 4/n+3 = 4(/n+l)-l. So each p t (for 1 <i<k), 
being smaller than p , must be of one of the first three forms.
However, the product of two numbers of these forms never 
gives a number of the form 4/n-l. This is a matter of routine 
checking:
Am • Am' = A(Amm')
= A(Amm'+m)
= A(Amm'+2m)
-  A(Amm'+m+m')+l 
= 4(4/n/n'+/n+2/n/)+2 
(4/n+2) • (4/n'+2) = 4(4/n/n'+2/n+2/n'+l).
Hence p  cannot be obtained by a product of p v ..., p k (for £>1) 
and it must itself be prime.
Am • (Am'+l 
Am • (4/n'+2 
(4/n+l) • (4/n'+l 
(4/n+l) • (4/n'+2
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2.1.4. A  difficult case. A case where the verification is 
genuinely difficult -perhaps even impossible- is this.
Conjecture (Goldbach). Every even number is the sum of 
two primes.
Construction. Obvious. Let n be any even number. Consider 
every prime number m for l<m<nl2. Then let p  be the first of 
these numbers such that n-p  is also prime, or, if there are not 
any put p -n ,  for definiteness.
Verification that our construction works as required. (That 
is: verification that we never have p —n , and hence for every 
even n, both p  and n-p  are prime). Not known; if it is possible 
it must be very difficult.
2.1.5. Discussion. According to the operational interpretation 
the constructive content of Goldbach’s conjecture (G) could 
have been realised already in the construction that I have 
just given, assuming that the conjecture is correct.
We cannot assert G because we do not have a proof of it, 
and we cannot assert either because we do not have a 
refutation -hence we can neither assert Gv^G. However, 
under this interpretation we might already possess the
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construction indicated by G -the construction meant by this 
statement according to the operational interpretation.
The same situation does not apply to all meaningful 
statements by any means. If we take the twin prime conjec­
ture, for example -the conjecture that there are infinitely 
many twin prime numbers-, we simply do not have any 
candidate for a construction which determines, for any 
natural number n, a pair of twin primes bigger than n.
We can search systematically for one -given a particular n-, 
but this would not be a well-defined intuitionistic construction 
since there is no guarantee that this operation will always 
terminate. This type of procedure would be acceptable in the 
Russian school of recursive mathematics (because the relation 
of ‘being twin primes' is decidable), but that is a different 
matter -e.g. the indirect classical proofs of 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 
would also be acceptable within this school.
Similarly, we do not have a construction for finding 7 
consecutive occurrences of a natural number n in the decimal 
expansion of n, or for finding a perfect number bigger than a 
given number n.
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2.1.6. The decidability of the proof relation. We saw at the 
time that Heyting did not distinguish essentially between the 
verificationist interpretation and the kind of interpretation 
which I have called ‘operational’. This was so because he was 
making the assumption that the proof of a statement and the 
realization of the construction that the statement demands 
are one and the same thing.
However, we can now conclude that this is wrong. Some­
times it is not at all obvious that the construction described 
works in the way it is required to; and in these cases it would 
be very misleading to call that construction alone a ‘proof' of 
the statement in question.
As Professor Machover once stressed to me, a proof is a 
convincing argument; if it does not convince us then it is not 
a proof. We might need some time to understand all the 
concepts that appear in the proof, and its internal structure, 
or to work out the trivial details that have not been made 
explicit by the author, but, assuming we are able to do all 
this, once we have done it, if it still does not convince us then  
it is not a proof.
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Tymozcko [1979] (p. 59) lists as the first of three essential 
requirements on proofs that they must be convincing. We 
could quote other sources (Wittgenstein [1956] (p. 171), Goad 
[1980] (p. 39)), but as Sundholm [1993] points out (pp. 48-49 
and 53), it is enough to look the word up in a dictionary.
In relation to this Nicolas Goodman wrote:
“(...) we often think we have a proof of an assertion when, as a 
matter of fact, the argument we have in mind is still confused. We 
[Goodman] take this fact as evidence not of the undecidability of 
the proof predicate, but rather of a lack of clarity in the way the 
putative proof is presented. (...) Thus we assume that a clearly 
given construction always either is or is not a proof of a given 
assertion” ([1970], p. 107).
2.1.7. A n interesting metaphor by Sundholm. Sundholm 
[1986] has advanced an interesting metaphor on this matter. 
He compares the understanding of a proof with the under­
standing of a sentence of the language, and writes:
“One can compare the situation with understanding a meaning­
ful sentence: we understand a meaningful sentence when we see 
(or hear!) one but if we don’t understand that does not necessarily 
mean that there is nothing there to be understood. Failure to 
understand a meaningful sentence seems parallel to failure to 
follow, or grasp, a proof.” (p. 493).
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This metaphor is a good one to illustrate our own position 
(indeed, it would have to be if meaning of sentences is to be 
explained in terms of proofs). Let us develop it a little. There 
are various ways in which we can fail to understand a 
sentence. One is when we do not know the meaning of some 
words, or the grammatical construction is new to us. That is: 
when we still do not have a full proficiency of the language in 
question, and the given sentence lies beyond our knowledge.
This situation can be compared with the case when we fail 
to understand a proof because we are not familiar with the 
notation used, or with the terminology, or with the corpus of 
basic facts that the author of the proof takes for granted 
(prerequisites). This case is not problematic. All we have to do 
is to study the language further, and in the case of a proof, to 
study further the background knowledge.
Another case would be when the sentence is so cumbersome 
that it exceeds our human capacity; for example, if it is very 
long (think of the sentence made up by putting together by 
using conjunctions, the sequence of all sentences which 
appear in Shakespeare’s works; or a sentence with an 
alternate chain of 2.000 universal and existential quantifiers).
103
In these cases we are faced with memory and processing 
limitations.
This can also happen in a proof: the typical example would 
be the celebrated proof of the 4-colour theorem. However, I do 
not think that these cases pose a serious problem for the 
decidability of the proof relation: the point is that if the proof 
is given with all its details (with everything made explicit), 
then it would have to be possible for any person of standard 
intelligence to check any single step  of the proof even if he 
could never check all of them , and therefore he could never 
grasp the proof as a whole.
2.1.8. More on the decidability. In any case, if the problem of 
understanding a proof is that there is a missing step in it 
which requires true ingenuity for it to be bridged, then we 
would say that the proof is incomplete and hence that 
properly speaking it was not a proof.
For example, we would not say that the construction for 
decomposing an even number into a sum of primes that I gave 
in 2.1.4 is a proof of Goldbach’s conjecture, because it does not 
prove it at all. Similarly, we should not say that the construc­
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tion I gave for finding infinitely many primes of the form 
4/72-1 (in 2.1.3) is a proof, because it is only a port of the 
proof, and it alone would not convince us that there are 
infinitely many such primes -unless we have figured out 
already the argument which comes later.
Only in the most trivial cases -such as 2.1.2- can we 
identify the basic construction in question and the proof of 
the corresponding statement; what happens in these cases is 
that the mere possession of the construction allows us to 
assert the corresponding statement.
We can now see that the dispute over the decidability of 
the proof relation was partly based on a misconception. The 
“basic intuitionistic idealization that we can recognize a proof 
when we see one” (Kreisel [1962], p. 202) could not be in 
doubt: any precise definition of the concept of ‘proof' -the 
intuitionistic or any other- should render it a decidable 
relation.
The real point was that if someone wants to avoid the 
appeal to Kreisel’s extra-clauses then he would have to avoid 
the concept of ‘proof' as well, and base the definition of the 
logical constants on an entirely different concept. A concept
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which intuitively would correspond to a non-decidable relation 
and whose definition, thus, would not require judgement 
clauses of any kind.
This shows that the naive interpretation of 1.5.7 is as it 
stands untenable.
2.1.9. Sundholm on proofs and constructions. Sundholm 
[1983] contains an interesting point which is that we should 
distinguish between constructions and proofs because the two 
notions are conceptually very far apart from each other. He 
gives the example of a proof of (AaH) ->A  (pp. 165-166); a proof 
in a natural deduction style would proceed by showing that A  
can be obtained from a proof of A a B  simply by taking the first 
component of such a proof -that is, by applying the function 
Axy.x (the combinator K).
Then, Sundholm argues that we should distinguish between 
the construction or function Axy.x itself, which is an object, 
and the process by means of which this object has been 
constructed; according to Sundholm the latter is at the same 
time the proof that the object works as required:
106
“That this object (this function, this construction) has such and 
such properties is guaranteed by the way it is constructed. (...) In 
order to prove any proposition one always has to exhibit a 
construction (object) (...), which must satisfy certain properties. 
These are guaranteed to hold by means of the construction 
(process) (...).” (p. 166).
Later (e.g. in [1993]) he insists on these and similar distinct­
ions.
This is related to what I called at the beginning of this 
chapter (in 2.1.1) the ‘fundamental dichotomy’, although it is 
not exactly similar; in fact, as it turns out, the fundamental 
dichotomy means that Sundholm is wrong. Here the distinc­
tion is mainly conceptual.
I think that Sundholm may have been misled by taking too 
simple a case, whereas the need for the extra-clauses certain­
ly did not arise from these type of cases. Indeed, Diller and 
Troelstra [1984] point out that:
“To what extent does a proof-object determine a proof? In other 
words, presented with a proof-object, can we construct a proof, that 
is, can we mentally follow a (proof-)process that results in the 
given proof object?
“In simple situations this is certainly possible (...). In general, 
this is not plausible any more. Consider for example the following 
situation: if ty V are closed numerical terms, t=t' is formally 
proved by evaluating £, V (...). However, a proof of £=£' as a 
mental construction (-process) with a corresponding proof-object
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concerns the objects n, m denoted by the terms t , t ' .  Comparison 
of these objects is immediate and carries no mathematical informa­
tion beyond the truth of the equation; so we amy as well denote 
such a trivial canonical proof by an arbitrary fixed object, say 0. A 
proof of Vx( £(x)=0), / a numerical term with parameter x , convinces 
us of the fact that Ax.O is a function which assigns to each xgN  a 
proof-object of £(*)=(), hence Ax.O is a proof-object for Vx(t(x)=0), 
from which we cannot reconstruct the possibly quite complicated 
argument showing that Vx(t(x)=0).” (pp. 258-259).
Hence they conclude that “the divergence between proof- 
objects and the informal arguments corresponding to formal 
proofs of the usual kind is at first sight unsatisfactory” (pp. 
259-260).
A case of this is the construction that I described before for 
finding, for each natural number n, a bigger prime of the form 
4m -l. It was not at all obvious by looking at the construction 
that it should work as required. Also, it was not clear that the 
process of finding the function can be identified with the proof 
-as a matter of fact, I first thought of such a construction as 
one intuitively plausible, then I tested it with some random 
cases of small numbers, and only after having convinced 
myself that it could work in general did I start to look for a 
proof. The judgement proof in this case, as we saw at the 
time, is itself a complicated argument which requires the
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consideration of new constructions as objects (e.g. the division 
algorithm to divide a natural number by 4); and the same will 
happen in similar cases.
2,1.10. More on Sundholms conceptual distinction. However, 
I do think that Sundholm has an interesting point in that 
conceptually there is a great difference between a construct­
ion (an object, a constructive function) and a proof (an 
argument); and that from this point of view the two should be 
separated, and the difference between the working component 
of Kreisel’s clauses and the judgement proof should be stres­
sed. In particular, a proof has an essential epistemic charac­
ter (it is a proof of something, it has an intentional charac­
ter), which a simple construction has not.
For example a proof of A  would serve in principle equally 
well as a proof of A  and as a proof of A vB  for any other 
statement B. Hence it is simultaneously a proof of infinitely 
many statements. Because of this Troesltra and van Dalen 
[1988] specify that a proof of A vB  is either a proof of A or a 
proof of B  “plus the stipulation that we want to regard the 
proof presented as evidence for A vB ” (p. 9). This would be
109
like requiring that the proof includes a ‘label’ which indicates 
which statement we want to regard it as a proof of.
Also Prawitz has insisted on this point: for instance, “it is 
not enough that we have just constructed these two canonical 
proofs separately to be in the position to assert A a B  -they 
entitle us only to assert A  and to assert B. To assert A a B  we 
must also be aware of the fact that these two proofs form a 
sufficient ground to go one step further and assert A a B ” 
([1977], pp. 25-26).
Later he insists:
“(...) it is not enough that the steps of a proof happen to follow 
from the preceding ones, it must also be seen that they follow; and 
it is this last requirement that must be attacked in any real 
analysis of the notion of proof.” ([1978], p. 26).
“To be in possession of a proof of a sentence, it is of course not 
sufficient to have constructed an argument for the sentence in the 
sense of something that has just the form of a proof, i.e. a 
structure of sentences some of which are said to follow from 
others. The argument must at least be supplemented, for each 
step, by some alleged ground for the claim that the step follows 
from certain preceding ones. (...) it [the alleged ground] must 
consist in knowledge of a procedure for how to find a canonical 
proof of the conclusion given canonical proofs of the premisses.” 
([1987], p. 160).
To sum up, this conceptual difference is of great interest.
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§2.2. The operational interpretation
2,2.1. The basis of the operational interpretation. The 
operational interpretation is based on the concept of a 
construction ‘performing’ the operations indicated by a given 
statement. This is different from ‘proving' the statement (or 
from ‘solving the problem corresponding to that statement'), 
in that it does not contain an implicit judgement that we have 
to know that the construction does that; but it is similar to 
the other phrases that Heyting used in his earlier papers.
The idea thus would be that the meaning of an intuitionis­
tic statement be given by the conditions under which a given 
construction performs the operations indicated by that sta­
tement. That is: it would be an interpretation based on 
‘performing conditions’.
Something similar is suggested by Bishop [1967] with 
respect to the conditional. According to him A->B  means that 
“the validity of the computational facts implicit in the 
statement A  must insure the validity of the computational 
facts implicit in the statement JB” (p. 7). It is also in the line 
of Kleene's realizability (see 3.1.3 later).
I l l
This interpretation will have a certain non-constructive 
character, but one which might not be very significant.
Indeed, on the contrary, to subscribe this interpretation we 
would have to accept the idea that a construction might 
perform certain operations independently of us having 
verified it so or being in a position to verify it -otherwise the 
difference with the verificationist interpretation would 
disappear; and this is contrary to the strictest intuitionistic 
doctrine, under which it is impossible that a construction 
might have a property that we are not in a position to verify:
‘They [mathematical objects] exist only in virtue of our 
mathematical activity, which consists in mental operations, and 
have only those properties which they can be recognized by us as 
having.” (Dummett [1977], p. 7).
On the other hand, this deviation may be a very small one. 
In fact this will only apply to some statements, relatively few: 
those for which we have already a ‘candidate' -a construction 
which could satisfy the statement-, but we lack the proof that 
it always works as required. Even in these cases we will not 
be able to assert the statement in question (say A), since we 
are not certain of our construction; and similarly we will not
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be able to assert -*A or even to assert A v^A . Dummett
himself in a later paper comes near to accepting this idea:
“Of course, we cannot have a procedure without knowing that 
we have it: but we may have it without knowing what its outcome 
will be. This depends upon its outcome’s being determinate, even 
though we do not know it; but I think we can go a certain distance 
along the road of admitting such determinacy without our theory’s 
collapsing into realism from another direction.
“These issues are difficult. I am far from sure how to resolve 
them (...).” ([1987], pp. 285-286).
2.2.2. The operational interpretation in action: the connec­
tives. I shall now give an example of the form that an 
operational interpretation of the logical constants could take. 
The discussion which comes later in the thesis could be used 
to modify it -and perhaps to improve it- at various points, but 
the following version will be helpful for future reference, as 
a prototype.
A similar interpretation has never been tried before in a 
systematic and completely explicit way, because, as we know, 
even those authors who intentionally eliminated the extra­
clauses from their definitions continued anyhow to give them  
in terms of proofs.
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The treatment of atomic statements is not different from 
that of the verificationist interpretation, since, as it is easy to 
see, the dichotomy between the construction that the state­
ment requires and a proof of it cannot arise in the case of an 
atomic statement. This is simply because according to the 
definition of an intuitionistic set -species- we must be given 
a decision procedure to determine whether a construction is 
or is not a proof that a particular object (or a sequence) 
belongs to it. Hence the proof relation with respect to atomic 
statements is always decidable, and no essential distinction 
can be made between a proof of the statement and a construc­
tion fulfilling it.
The definitions of conjunction and disjunction will not 
change its structure with respect to the verificationist 
interpretation, but only the basic terms in which it is formu­
lated:
(a) a construction performs A a B  when it performs A  and 
performs B ;
(b) a construction performs A vB  when either it performs A  or 
performs B.
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The definitions of -> and “• could proceed as in the naive 
interpretation but with the new terminology:
(c) a construction c performs A->B  when for any construction 
d , i f d  performs A  then c(d) performs B;
and then let 1  be a fixed atomic construction which is 
obviously impossible,
(d) a construction c performs “lA when for any construction d, 
if d  performs A  then c(d) performs _L.
2.2.3. The operational interpretation of the quantifiers.
(a) a construction c performs \fxA(x) when, for any construc­
tion d  in the domain, cid) performs A(d);
and the clause for the existential quantifier:
(b) a construction c performs 3xA(x) when it is a construction 
such that A(c).
In the formulation of (b) I do not require the corresponding 
proof that c satisfies this condition, or, rather, I do not 
require the construction which would perform the statement 
A(c), because this seems more in line with the spirit of the 
present interpretation. In fact it coincides with Heyting’s
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definition of [1956], although all other authors do require this 
second construction.
I am not too sure about this point (see also 2.3.5 later). In 
any case we could add that requirement without any worry, 
since it will not destroy the inductive structure of the 
definition.
2.2A. The naive interpretation revisited. We can now come 
back to what was wrong with the naive interpretation (1.5.7). 
In particular, according to this interpretation we recall that 
a proof of \/xA(x) is a construction which transforms every 
construction of an object c in the domain into a proof of 
A(c).
However, as we have seen here again and again this clause is 
very misleading, because it is simply not true that a proce­
dure to transform each object c into a proof of A(c) is necessa­
rily itself a proof of \/xA(x) (cf. 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 for example). 
The same happens with his definition of the conditional: 
a construction c proves A— when for any construction rf, 
if d  proves A  then c{d) proves B.
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Indeed, suppose for example that A(x) and B(x) are two 
numerical conditions, and that we have found a calculation to 
transform any number satisfying A(x) into one satisfying B(x). 
Then we can use this method to transform any proof of 3xA(x) 
into a proof of 3xB(x), simply by applying these calculations to 
the number provided in the proof of 3xA(x), and then checking 
that the result is a number satisfying B(x) -assuming that the 
latter is decidable.
However, this procedure will not be a proof of 
3xA{x) -» 3xB(x) 
unless we have a separate argument that it will always work 
as expected, something which, again, might be very far from 
obvious.
2.2.5. More on the naive definition o /-» . Moreover, the prece­
ding definition of the conditional faces an additional problem: 
in the case where the antecedent A  is false and hence there 
can be no proofs of it, the definition is vacuous and according­
ly anything would be a proof of A->B  -because there will be no 
proofs of A  to transform.
Heyting had already noticed this problem:
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“You remember that A->J3 can be asserted if and only if we 
possess a construction which, joined to the construction A, would 
prove B. Now suppose that |— iA , that is, we have deduced a 
contradiction from the supposition that A  were carried out. Then, 
in a sense, this can be considered as a construction, which, joined 
to a proof of A  (which cannot exist) leads to a proof of B. I shall 
interpret the implication in this wider sense.” ([1956], p. 102).
However, once we have established that A  is false it will 
remain the case that anything is a proof of A —>B, according to 
the main clause.
In a case where both the direct proof of A -» 5  and -in 
particular- the proof of “iA were truly difficult we could end 
up with the paradoxical situation that after having finally 
found a proof of ~*A we would have to conclude that anything 
was a proof of A— anyway.
2,2,6. The naive definition of To make matters even worse 
the naive definition of is also defective:
a construction c is a proof of i A when for any construction 
d, if d proves A  then c{d) proves a contradiction ±.
Then, if A is actually false there will never be a proof of it 
and hence, as before, any arbitrary construction will vacuous­
ly satisfy the clause.
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This means that once a construction is accepted as a proof 
of a negation statement then any other construction would 
have to be regarded as a proof of it too.
Of course, none of these paradoxes arise under the presence 
of Kreisel’s extra-clauses, which require not only one cons­
truction that transforms all proofs of A  into whatever else 
-which it may do in a vacuous way-, but also a second 
construction that ‘verifies' this; and obviously not any 
arbitrary construction will do that.
2.2.7. Hypothetical constructions. The operational interpreta­
tion is also affected by this problem although in a more 
indirect way. Indeed, according to this interpretation it is also 
the case that if A  is false then any construction would 
vacuously ‘perform' “iA or A-±B  -for any B  (see 1.5.7). This is 
somehow less paradoxical because the concept of ‘performing' 
is more flexible, and it does not have to correspond to an 
intuitive use as in the case of ‘proof'.
In other words: the only purpose of the operational defini­
tion is to give an adequate explanation of the logical opera­
tors, and the concept which is placed at the centre of it only
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has to satisfy a technical role. In contrast, the verificationist 
interpretation carries with it the inductive definition of the 
notion of ‘proof’, and hence it is constrained by the inherent 
properties of this notion.
In any case, a way out of these paradoxes without appeal­
ing to Kreisel’s extra-clauses -and which could be used for 
both the verificationist and the operational interpretation- is 
the use of conditional proofs or ‘proofs from premises'. This is 
essentially what Kolmogorov did in his definitions of and 
and Heyting in his definition of I shall discuss it in detail 
later in this chapter.
2.2.8. The operational interpretation and the theory of 
meaning. As is well-known, the work of Michael Dummett in 
recent times has connected intuitionism with a number of 
philosophical issues. In particular, he has pointed to the 
explanations of the intuitionistic logical constants as the 
general pattern of a verificationist theory of meaning for a 
natural language, which he has been trying to reformulate:
“The intuitionistic explanations of the logical constants provide 
a prototype for a theory of meaning in which truth and falsity are 
not the central notions.
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(...)
“Such a theory generalizes readily to the non-mathematical 
case” ([1976], p. 110).
The interest of Dummett in intuitionism is part of a 
general inclination towards anti-realist positions in several 
philosophical fields. In fact he was the first to notice that 
some of the most characteristic features of intuitionism -such 
as the rejection of bivalence, the adoption of intuitionistic 
logic or the inadequacy of a theory of meaning based on truth- 
conditions- were also common to all other versions of philoso­
phical anti-realism:
“In a variety of different areas there arises a philosophical 
dispute of the same general character: the dispute for or against 
realism concerning statements about a certain type of subject- 
matter, or, better, statements of a certain general type.” ([1969], 
p. 358).
“It is difficult to avoid noticing that a common characteristic of 
realist doctrines is an insistence on the principle of bivalence -that 
every proposition, of the kind under dispute, is determinately 
either true or false. (...) What anti-realists were slow to grasp was 
that, conversely, they had in the most typical cases equally 
compelling grounds to reject bivalence and, with it, the law of 
excluded middle. (...)
“Those who first clearly grasped that rejecting realism entailed 
rejecting classical logic were the intuitionists (...).” ([1991], p. 9).
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Among the list of areas in which the dispute between 
realism and anti-realism arises, Dummett includes -apart 
from mathematics- subjunctive conditionals ([1976], p. 81), 
material objects, theoretical entities of science, mental states, 
events and processes, statements about the past or the future 
([1978], pp. 147-148), or ethical judgements ([1991], p. 6).
The interest of a verificationist theory of meaning for a 
fragment of the language which we wish to interpret in a non­
realist way is very simple: to give meaning conditions which 
do not transcend any possible recognition:
“According to this [the anti-realist account], the meanings of 
statements of the class in question are given to us, not in terms of 
the conditions under which these statements are true or false, 
conceived of as conditions which obtain or do not obtain in­
dependently of our knowledge or capacity for knowledge, but in 
terms of the conditions which we recognise as establishing the 
truth or falsity of statements of that class.” ([1969], pp. 358-359).
As it happens, Dummett has identified these other condi­
tions with the assertability (or proof) conditions, as has 
almost everybody else, to the point that the phrases ‘in­
tuitionistic theory of meaning' and ‘verificationist theory of 
meaning' are often equated (e.g. Martin-Lof [1987], pp. 409, 
413, Dalla Pozza and Garola [1995], p. 101).
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However, if my argument is correct then, in the case that 
Kreisel’s extra-clauses were to be rejected, the central concept 
of the definition would no longer be that of ‘proof’, and hence 
the whole project of a verificationist theory of meaning for a 
natural language would have to be modified into an ‘opera­
tional’ theory of meaning or something of the like.
I shall not pursue here the idea of the adaptation of this 
meaning theory for a natural language, but perhaps it is 
adequate to notice that if this interpretation is suitable for 
intuitionism then there is no reason why it should not be 
suitable for other forms of anti-realism too. In particular, 
although there is an ingredient of ‘non-constructiveness’ -or 
recognition transcendence- in the concept of ‘performing’, if it 
is intuitionistically acceptable, then it could also be acceptable 
in anti-realism in general.
2.2.9. Recapitulation. I shall not attempt to resolve the 
question of which general form -the verificationist or the 
operationalist- an adequate interpretation of the intuitionistic 
logical constants should take. The point that I have tried to 
stress is that the result of eliminating Kreisel’s extra-clauses
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from the definition, is an interpretation of the operational 
type, where the central concept is not that of ‘proof’ and 
which will necessarily have a certain non-constructive 
character.
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§2.3. Kreisel’s interpretation revisited
2.3.1. Introduction. A close analysis of Kreisel’s interpretation 
shows that the role of judgement proofs in the definition is 
partly redundant and can be made more precise. When we try 
to do this, however, we discover a surprising relation between 
Kreisel’s interpretation and the operational.
2.3.2. A  suggestion by Kreisel. The inspiration here came 
from a footnote by Kreisel himself, where he says:
“There is an additional distinction which has so far not been 
formally necessary, but which is probably important, for example 
in the explanation of implication (or universal quantification). 
When we think of the pair (cltc2)
cx proves the identity: for variable d, if d  proves A  then c2(d) 
proves B,
c2 is a genuine function or operation, while cr recognizes that c2 
satisfies the condition stated; thus cx is a judgement. But similarly, 
since in general both the arguments d  and the values c2(d) of c2 are 
such pairs, say d=(dlJd2) and c2(d)=(cz1,a2), should the function <% 
depend both on d2 and d1 (or only on d^)T (Kreisel [1970], footnote 
11, pp. 145-146).
Kreisel does not answer his own question, and surprisingly 
enough he has not developed this point since -at least not to 
my knowledge.
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The natural answer is ‘only on c^\ Indeed, let us suppose 
for example that c proves a statement \fxA(x)->\/xB(x). This 
means that we will have
(a) c1 proves: for any d, if d proves VxA(x) then c2(d) proves 
\fxB(x).
Now assume that d=(dvd2) is an actual proof of \fxA{:c), that 
is:
dj proves: for any b, dL^ b) proves A(b).
Hence c2(d) will prove VxH(x); and if we put 
c2(d) - a  -  (a^cQ 
then we obtain
a2 proves: for any b, a^b) proves B{b).
The question is: should depend on dx?; that is to say: 
should it depend not only on the ‘working' proof of the antece­
dent (cQ, but also on its corresponding judgement proof (c )^? 
The answer seems clear to me: ‘only on cLJ.
As a matter of fact, in general there will be various diffe­
rent ways in which to establish that d2 does the work required 
by VxA(x). Each of them will constitute a good candidate for 
a judgement proof dt of the corresponding construction d; but 
there is no reason why the manner in which d2 is transformed
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into a construction -which does the work required by 
\/xB(x)- should vary according to the judgement proof which 
accompanies d^ .
Of course the corresponding judgement proof for a2 -that is, 
dj- could depend on it, but that is a completely different 
matter; in fact, as we shall see immediately, aY is quite 
irrelevant in the presence of cv
2.3.3, Discussion. Now let us suppose that we are actually in 
possession of the proof c, and in particular, of its first 
component -the judgement- cv This means that we can prove 
that c2 will work as required, that is: we can prove that c2 will 
transform all proofs of VxA(x) into proofs of VxB(x).
Then suppose that we are given not a full proof of VxA(x), 
but simply a method which transforms any construction b in 
the domain into a proof of A(b) -that is: the working com­
ponent of a full proof d.
We already know that the result of applying c2 to this 
method -that is, c2(c^ )- will result in the production of a 
method corresponding to \fxB{x): a method which transforms 
any construction b in the domain into a proof of B(b). This is
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so precisely because Og, the working component of the proof of 
\fxB{x), could not depend in any essential way on whatever 
judgement proof was given accompanying the construction d^ .
Moreover, our general judgement Cj must ensure that this 
is so: that c2(dj is a method corresponding to VxJ3(x). Indeed, 
we have, on the one hand, that c1 proves that c2 transforms 
all proofs of \/xA(x) into proofs of VxB(x). Hence it must, in 
particular, transform the working component of the proof of 
VxA(x) into a working component for a proof of \/xB(x). In this 
transformation the nature of the respective judgement proofs 
of VxA(x) and VxJB(x) does not make a difference: cx cannot use 
them in any essential way.
Therefore we conclude that c1 proves, in particular, that 
c2(dj is a method corresponding to VxB(x).
However, in that case, why should we make any further 
reference to the judgement proofs of VxA(x) or VxB(x)? If I am 
supplied with an actual proof of VxA(x), say d={dlid^, then I 
proceed to feed d2 into c2 to get the working component of a 
proof of VxB(x). By cx I know that if was a method accord­
ing to \/xA(x) then the result c2(d?) will be a method according
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to \fxB(x)\ and by dx I know that <4 was indeed a method 
according to \focA{x).
Hence I can immediately construct an argument to the 
effect that c2(<4) is a method for \/xB(x), that is: a judgement 
proof to accompany c2(c4).
This means that Kreisel’s definition as it stands is too 
complicated, and unnecessarily so.
2.3.4. The operational definition reappears. The obvious way 
to resolve this redundancy is to give two inductive definitions, 
one right after the other. The first would not include judge­
ment proofs at all, and hence it would coincide exactly with 
the operational definition of meaning; and the second one 
would be based on the first, but adding the requirement of 
judgement proofs wherever they are needed.
The result will be that in analysing what is the proof of a 
given statement according to the definition only one judge­
ment proof will be required -the last one.
2.3.5. KreiseVs definition polished. We assume that we have 
an operational definition for the notion of a construction ‘per­
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forming’ the operations required by a given statement. On the 
basis of that concept we define this version of the verification- 
ist interpretation. The cases of atomic, conjunction and 
disjunction statements -which do not require judgement 
proofs- are treated as usual (1.5.2).
Then:
(a) c is a proof of A-+B  if c is a pair (c1?c2) such that c1 proves 
that for every construction d  in the domain, if d  performs A  
then c(d) performs B.
(b) c is a proof of "Vl if c is a pair (cltc2) such that c1 proves 
that for every construction d  in the domain, if d  performs A  
then c(d) performs the impossible construction _L.
(c) c is a proof of \fxA{x) if c is a pair (clyc2) such that c1 
proves that for every construction d  in the domain, c(d) 
performs A(d).
(d) c is a proof of 3xA(x) if c is a pair (cvc2) such that cx 
proves A(c£.
It is interesting to notice that in the definition of 3 the first 
component cx of the construction c is clearly a judgement 
proof as well. For instance, a proof of 3xA(x) —> 3xB(x) will 
require a method of transforming every particular instance of
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A(x) into one of B(x) -that is, c2-, plus the judgement proof that 
the method does this -cv However, we do not need to invoke 
a hypothetical judgement proof for 3ocA(x), nor the way to 
transform it into one for 3xB(x). c2 will be enough to do this, 
as it happened in the case discussed in 2.3.3.
This suggests that the status of the first component of a 
proof of an existential statement (cl in d  above) is essentially 
that of a judgement proof, despite the fact that it does not 
break the inductive structure of the clause.
2.3.6. Discussion. The conclusion of my argument here is that 
the operational definition has an importance which is 
independent of whether we consider it as the basic semantic 
definition or not, since -if I am correct- it is the basis of 
Kreisel’s definition anyhow. Hence the concept o f‘performing’ 
which is induced by the operational definition would have an 
interest in itself, and would deserve to be studied, whichever 
position we adopt on the debate over the extra-clauses.
Moreover, if we accept that the notion of performing has an 
independent sense in itself (and if we are to revise Kreisel’s 
interpretation as suggested here we must do so) then we must
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also accept that it is possible (intuitionistically meaningful) to 
interpret mathematical statements in these terms, and then 
the most natural thing is to do so. In other words: the 
operational interpretation is simpler and more natural, and 
therefore if it is not the correct one it must be because it does 
not make sense constructively; and if it does make sense 
constructively, then, it appears, it must be the correct one.
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§2.4. Canonical proofs
2.4.1. Introduction. The need to draw a distinction between 
canonical and non-canonical proofs has been defended in 
response to various different motivations. The simplest one 
-which I shall discuss first- is the existence of indirect proofs 
in which the elements required by the corresponding clauses 
are not actually provided, but only an effective procedure for 
finding them.
This is particularly obvious in the case of disjunction and 
existential statements when, instead of producing a proof of 
one of the disjuncts, or producing an element of the domain 
which satisfies the existential claim, a mere procedure for 
finding one is indicated. Brouwer had already noticed this 
quite clearly:
“The case that A  has neither been proved to be true nor to be 
absurd, but that we know a finite algorithm leading to the 
statement either that A  is true, or that A  is absurd, obviously is 
reducible to the first and second cases.” ([1981], p. 92, footnote).
Something similar happens sometimes with atomic state­
ments. For example a proof of 
1010- 102° =  1030
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may proceed not by performing the actual calculations -which 
would be impossible in practice- but by showing that the 
equality xy-xz= xy+z holds in general -by induction-; that is: by 
giving a general method which, if effected, would produce a 
proof for any triple of natural numbers (x,y,z).
Finally, a similar problem may occur with informal proofs 
of conjunction statements, although in a derivative way: when 
either of the conjuncts is of one of the above forms. However 
this problem cannot arise with conditional, negation or 
universal statements -at least under Kreisers clauses- 
because the definition of them already refers to an effective 
method.
2.4.2. Canonical proofs versus demonstrations. In informal 
intuitionistic mathematics the use of this type  of proofs is not 
only normal -starting with Brouwer himself- but sometimes, 
as we have seen, the only kind of proof available to us for 
practical reasons.
The structure of these proofs is similar to that of the proofs 
of conditionals, negations and universal quantifications in 
that the fundamental dichotomy that I discussed in 2.1.1
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reappears: once the proof contains an effective method to do 
something, there is an immediate need for the corresponding 
judgement proof that the method works as required -some­
thing which might not be obvious.
There are essentially two ways in which to tackle this 
problem (cf. Dummett [1977], p. 20). One is to reformulate the 
clauses for atomic, disjunction and existential statements so 
as to allow that, for example, a proof of a disjunction be 
simply an effective method to find a proof of one of the 
disjuncts, and not necessarily the actual proof itself. This 
would call for the requirement of judgement proofs within 
these clauses, thereby changing the meaning attributed to 
these logical constants -and to atomic statements.
The other way -which is the one recommended by Dum­
mett- is to leave the definition unchanged, but to stipulate 
that the assertion of a mathematical statement need not be 
understood as a claim that we have a proof of it, but only that 
we have a method, in principle, for obtaining one -plus a proof 
that the method does this (cf. as well Prawitz [1977], p. 27). 
In other words, to distinguish between canonical proofs, 
which would be the ones defined by the usual clauses, and
135
any general argument in which a procedure for finding a 
canonical proof is described. Dummett calls this second type 
of argument a ‘demonstration' ([1975], p. 122 and [1977], p. 
392).
2.4.3. Canonical and normal form proofs. Prawitz has related 
the canonical proofs in the preceding sense with the proofs in  
normal form of a system of natural deduction. Roughly 
speaking, a normal form proof is one without roundabouts or 
‘cuts' -local peaks of logical complexity.
In fact the first time that the phrase ‘canonical proof' was 
used in this context was precisely to compare them with 
normal form proofs (Prawitz [1974], p. 71; see also [1973], pp. 
232-233, where the same idea is already present, and the 
remark in [1985], Note 1, p. 171).
Since we have been so far, considering categorical proofs 
only -that is, proofs without premises- the normal proofs in 
question would be those which do not use at all the elimina­
tion rules. Naturally, this kind of proofs would always be 
canonical in the preceding sense -e.g. a normal proof of a
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disjunction A vB  cannot proceed in any other way but from a 
previous proof of A  or of B.
It is to be noticed, however, that the converse is not strictly 
true: a proof might be canonical according to the definition 
without being in normal form -e.g. a proof of A vB  might 
contain an unnecessary detour but still constitute an actual 
proof of A  or of B.
2.4.4. The impredicativity of -» and A second reason to 
introduce some notion of canonical proof concerns the 
definition of the conditional. As we saw at the time, this 
definition -within both Kreisel’s and Heyting’s interpret­
ations- is highly impredicative, in that it refers to the totality  
of proofs of the antecedent A, a totality which presumably 
would include the proof of A->B  itself, as well as proofs which 
could have been built up from it in some way; and a similar 
thing happens with the definition of
This impredicativity would be ameliorated if we could refer 
in the clause not to arbitrary proofs of the antecedent in 
general, but only to some restricted, particularly simple, type 
of proofs. In other words: if the basis of the proof of A->B  was
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a construction which transformed all canonical proofs of A  
into proofs of B. However, if we did that, then we would have 
to make sure that any arbitrary proof of A  can be reduced to 
one of the canonical type, or otherwise we would not be 
justified in the unrestricted use of modus ponens once a proof 
of A  -of any kind- has actually being found.
This would presuppose a reducibility hypothesis, that for 
any given statement there is an a priori limit on the com­
plexity that a proof of it needs to have. This hypothesis was 
first explicitly formulated in Kreisel [1965] (pp. 126-127) -as 
a hypothesis, not as a claim.
Later, Nicolas Goodman, for example, has adhered to it 
firmly:
“It seems to us essential to the intuitionistic position that given 
a fixed assertion A  about a well-defined domain, there is always 
an a priori upper bound to the complexity of possible proofs of A.
In case A  is an implication, this principle already guarantees the 
existence of some sort of reducibility operator.” ([1970], p. 111).
2,4,5, Dummett on the need for canonical proofs. Dummett 
has gone farther to argue that without a distinction between
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canonical and non-canonical proofs the definition of -» would 
become vacuous. In particular Dummett worries that
“We could admit anything we liked as constituting a proof of 
A-±B, and it would remain the case that, given such a proof, we 
had an effective method of converting any proof of A into a proof 
of Bf namely by adding the proof of A-+B and performing a single 
inference by modus ponens. Obviously, this is not what is inten­
ded”. ([1975], p. 123).
Hence, he concludes
“(...) if the intuitionistic explanation of implication is to escape, 
not merely circularity, but total vacuousness, there must be a 
restricted type of proof -canonical proof- in terms of which the 
explanation is given, and which does not admit modus ponens save 
in subordinate deductions”. ([1975], p. 123).
Naturally, as it is very easy to see, a similar argument can 
be applied to V: an arbitrary construction c could also be used 
allegedly to construct a vacuous ‘proof’ of VxA(x), simply by 
considering that c is already a proof of VxA(x), and then using 
it to eliminate A(n) for any given n; and a similar argument 
would apply to
I think, however, that Dummett is wrong. Indeed, suppose 
that we admitted an arbitrary construction as a proof of A->B  
and immediately after we used it to obtain B  from A  using 
modus ponens; then, would the resulting construction consti-
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tute a proof B  according to the inductive definition? Not 
necessarily. For example, if B is an existential statement 
3xC(x), then the resulting proof of B  should indicate an object 
a plus a proof of C(a), or else a procedure for finding them; 
but the vacuous construction of Dummett’s that I have just 
described will not in general do this.
2.4.6. More on DummetVs argument. In [1977] Dummett 
refined his argument slightly, by considering as the basis of 
the vacuous proof, not arbitrary constructions in general but 
only those previous proofs of A->B  which are intuitively valid 
from the intuitionistic point of view:
“(...) whatever we chose to accept as being a proof of A->B, it 
would, provided that it itself conformed to the canons of ordinary 
informal proof, supply us with an effective means of transforming 
any proof of A  into a proof of B, namely by annexing to the proof 
of A  the given proof of A-+B  and then appending a single applica­
tion of modus ponens”. (p. 393).
Then he concludes, accordingly:
‘The constraints on what constituted a proof of statements of 
these kinds would then all come from whatever intuitive prior 
notion of an informal proof we were appealing to (...).
“Obviously, however, this is not what is intended when these 
explanations of the logical constants are given.” (p. 393).
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However he again misses the point that, as before, what 
matters is that the procedure yields proofs of B  which agree 
with the rest of the definition; and that is something indepen­
dent of any prior informal notion of validity.
To see this clearly, let us consider the following example. 
Let c be a proof of A— and let us assume that c is canonical 
and perfectly valid by all standards. Then we can apply 
Dummett’s construction to c in the obvious way: for any given 
proof of A, join it with c and obtain B  by modus ponens. Let 
d  be this new construction.
In the presence of a proof of A we have that d  will certainly 
be enough to convince us of the truth of B , at least as much 
as c is enough to convince us of A->B. However, surprisingly 
enough d  will not in general be a proof of B  according to the 
inductive definition.
Indeed, let us consider for example the conditional 
3xA(x)—>3xB(x), where 3xA{x) and 3xB(x) are numerical state­
ments, and suppose that c provides a way of transforming any 
given number with the property A(x) into another one with 
the property B(x). For the sake of argument we may also 
assume that c also includes a proof that the construction
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works as required, a decision procedure for B(x), and whatever 
else is needed.
Then, given a proof of 3xA{x) we could apply c to it to 
obtain an object a and a proof of B(a), or at least a procedure 
for finding them -if the proof of 3xA(x) does not give an object 
explicitly.
On the other hand, by its own construction d  will only yield 
an argument to the effect that 3xB(x) holds; an argument 
which will be good enough to gain conviction that it holds and 
can be proven constructively, but not a proof according to the 
inductive definition. Indeed, in the case where the proof of 
3xA{x) provides a definite object a such that A(a), the result of 
applying d  to it will not yield a corresponding number 
satisfying B(x); and in the case when the proof of 3xA(x) 
consists in providing a procedure for finding a, then d  will not 
point to the corresponding procedure which would consist in 
obtaining a method for finding an instance of B(x), by append­
ing c to it. Instead, all d  points to in both cases is a certain 
inference by modus ponens.
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Therefore, we have to conclude that the result of applying 
d  to a proof of 3xA(x) will be a good argument for 3xB(x), but 
not yet a proof of it.
The real proof -c- is somehow contained within d; but d  
does not exhibit it in the appropriate way, and because of this 
it does not qualify.
As we can see, the situation is not at all one in which the 
constraints on what constituted a proof would come from an 
intuitive notion of informal proof, as Dummett feared, but 
rather, the opposite.
2.4.7. Proofs in normal form again. In the case of the non- 
canonical proofs of 2.4.2 the reducibility hypothesis is obvious, 
since they are defined precisely as any effective procedure for 
obtaining a canonical proof. However, the restriction to 
canonical proofs in this sense -i.e. proofs which agree exactly 
in the clauses for v, 3 and atomic statements- would not 
reduce the impredicativity of —» and ”• in any significant way: 
among those proofs of the antecedent A  which are canonical 
in this sense, there might very well be some that have been 
built up from the proof of A-+B, which is the proof that is
being defined. The range of ‘canonical proofs’ of this type is 
huge.
A good candidate, however, for such a reduction would be 
the concept of ‘proof in normal form’. A proof of A  in normal 
form, being free of roundabouts, would build up gradually and 
could not use a statement more complex than A  itself -hence 
could not be based on A->B . If the definition of -» referred 
exclusively to normal proofs, the impredicativity would 
disappear.
However, in the case of normal form proofs the reducibility 
hypothesis is not so obvious. The normal form proof theorems 
for intuitionistic systems of sequents (Gentzen [1934], the 
Hauptsatz) and of natural deduction (Prawitz [1965]) esta­
blish that within these formal systems every proof can be 
reduced to one in normal form. However, it is not so clear 
whether an analogous result applies outside formal mathe­
matics.
Prawitz [1977] observes:
“(...) the presence of —> and V have the effect that in general 
the conditions for asserting a sentence cannot be exhausted by any 
formal system; (...) there is no formal system generating all the 
procedures that transform canonical proofs of A  to canonical
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proofs of B y and it is left open what more complicated sentences 
can be involved in such procedures. For instance, such a procedure 
may be definable in an extension of a certain language without 
being definable in the language itself, and hence, in this respect, 
the extension of a language obtained by introducing new logical 
constants may not be a conservative extension of the original 
language. Consequently, while the operations of forming canonical 
proofs run parallel to the introduction rules of Gentzen’s system 
of natural deduction, it is clear that the rules for asserting a 
sentence do not amount to inference rules of any formal system.”
(p. 29).
In [1987] he mentions Godel’s first incompleteness theorem to 
argue again that a statement might be provable, but not if we 
restrict the proof to particularly simple methods:
“From Godel’s incompleteness theorem, we know indeed that, 
unlike the situation in first order predicate logic, a sentence \/xA(x) 
or Vx(A(x)-^B(x)) with A(x) and B(x) recursive, although unprovable 
in elementary arithmetic, may be provable by introducing new 
concepts outside elementary arithmetic and principles for them, 
and that, on the whole, we cannot at all put any formal constraints 
on how such a sentence can be proved.” (p. 159).
Dummett has also made a similar point:
“(...) it does not follow, from the normalization theorem for first- 
order logic, that a similar theorem will hold good for any specific 
formalized first-order theory for some part of intuitionistic mathe­
matics. What our present considerations show is that it is both 
necessary and plausible that a normalization property should hold 
good of those canonical intuitive proofs which constitute the
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fundamental type of mental constructions in terms of which any 
intuitionistic theory is given meaning.” ([1977], pp. 396-397).
2.4.8. Dummett on the stability of proofs. In more general 
terms, Dummett has doubted that the methods of mathe­
matical proof can be surveyed in advance, and hence that we 
can put any limit on the minimum complexity that a convin­
cing argument for a given statement needs to have. In [1977] 
he also mentions Godel’s theorem and concludes that “the 
totality of methods of proof, within a given mathematical 
theory, is likely to be an indefinitely extensible one” (p. 401).
This leads him to the surprising conclusion that a mathe­
matical theorem such as A->B  could be fallible. Dummett’s 
argument is as follows. Suppose that we have a construction 
c such that, for any proof of A which has been elaborated with 
our present proof methods, c will transform it into a proof of 
B. According to Dummett this should be enough to accept c as 
a proof of A->B; but then it could happen that later we 
discover an entirely new way of proving A, and that the 
application of c to this new proof does not result in a proof of 
B:
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“When this happens, some proof, involving a conditional A-±B, 
that had formerly seemed acceptable, may be invalidated. Hence, 
because of the peculiarities of the intuitionistic interpretation 
provability is not a stable property (...); mathematics becomes a 
subject whose results are fallible and liable to revision, like those 
of other sciences.” ([1977], pp. 401-402).
However, the acceptance of such an assumption would 
constitute a change in meaning of -» far more dramatic than 
the problem of its impredicativity, which we were trying to 
solve in the first place.
Prawitz finds this last conclusion of Dummett’s rather 
extreme:
“These consequences are indeed very strange, I think. That the 
development of mathematics by the emergence of new forms of 
reasoning should put in doubt all previous proofs of implications 
and force us to reconsider them seems to be contrary to our 
historical experience.” ([1987], p. 158).
To which Dummett replies:
“I feel as unhappy as he [Prawitz] does with the conclusion that 
mathematical proof, and hence mathematical truth, is unstable; 
whether he has found the way to avoid this conclusion would take 
too long to discuss.” ([1987], p. 285).
Finally, we must observe that if the meaning of a statement 
A  is clearly understood, there will be nothing in a hypotheti­
cal proof of A  which could bring about a change in this
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meaning. We know what any possible proof of A  must and 
will show: the possibility of the transformations claimed by A .
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§2.5. Canonical proofs (continued)
2.5.1. Goodmans levels. A different attempt to resolve the 
impredicativity of the definition of —> is Nicolas Goodman's 
stratification of the universe of proofs and constructions into 
a cumulative hierarchy of levels, according not to their 
internal complexity, but to their subject matter (Goodman 
[1970]). In particular, there would be a first level containing 
the basic constructions of the universe (in the typical case, 
the natural numbers), plus all constructive functions operat­
ing on them. The second level would include the whole of the 
first level, plus those proofs which operate on all the cons­
tructions of the first level, e.g. the proofs of a statement A->B  
where A  belongs to the first level; and so on.
More formally, Goodman assigns to each statement A  a 
depth , according to the “nesting” of conditionals and universal 
quantifiers in it -he treats negations as a special case of 
conditional statements. Inductively, if A is an atomic state­
ment then its depth </(A) is 0; if A -B w C  or A=BaC then
</(A)=max{*/(B), c/{C)}\ if A=3xB(x) then af{A)-r/{B{x))\ and 
finally if A=B—>C then ^/(A)=l+max{^/(5), /^(C)}, and if 
A=VxB(x) then </(A)=l+</(B(x)). In short, if we consider the
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tree-process of formation of the statement according to the 
syntactic rules of the language, the depth is the biggest 
number of conditional and universal quantifiers that have 
been added in a single branch.
Although the definition of V is not as clearly impredicative 
as that of — Goodman treats the occurrences of these two 
logical operators equally (e.g. in his definition of depth). 
Perhaps the point is that although in the definition of a proof 
c of a statement \/xA(x) not all arbitrary proofs are referred to, 
(only all constructions within  the domain, which are usually 
simple objects, and not proofs), nevertheless c must transform 
any one of them, say d, into a proof of A(d), and it is for this 
latter proof that c itself could be somehow invoked.
Then Goodman defines a proof of a conditional statement 
A->B  as a construction which transforms all proofs of A  of 
level af(A—kB) into proofs of B. Since the proofs of level af{A->B)
cannot yet refer to itself, the impredicativity is avoided.
However, as before, the problem with Goodman’s stratifica­
tion is the weak intuitive validity of the corresponding 
reducibility hypothesis. As a result, few people have accepted
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this division into levels. The following quote by Weinstein 
contains the basic objection:
“Goodman’s response to this problem created by stratifying the 
universe of constructions is to suppose that any proof of a 
statement which involves quantification only over constructions of 
a given level may be replaced by a proof of the next highest level. 
(...) But the justification for this assumption is not very clear. Let 
us consider, for example, the statement for every natural number, 
n, f(n)=0. It may be that any proof which we in fact have of this 
statement is an argument the premisses of which involve quan­
tification over constructions of a high level. If, as Goodman 
assumes, constructions of natural numbers lie at the lowest level 
then the above assumption implies that we must be able to extract 
from such a proof another proof of the statement which does not 
make use of quantification over high levels of the constructive 
universe. That we have a proof of the statement in question 
implies that there is a constructive function which assigns to each 
natural number, n, a proof that /(n)=0. But I see no reason to 
think that we have grounds to assert that this constructive 
function has the property in question which do not make use of 
insights about higher levels of the constructive universe.” ([1983], 
pp. 265-266).
2.5.2. Brouwer's fully analyzed proofs'. A third reason for 
wanting to draw a distinction between proofs in general and 
proofs of a predetermined, canonical form, is the desire to 
make a full exploitation of Brouwer's conditional. This was 
Brouwer's motivation behind the introduction of his own
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notion of canonical proof -that which Dummett [1975] (p. 183) 
called ‘fully analyzed proof’-, in the attempted proof of the bar 
theorem (see e.g. Brouwer [1927]).
I shall not discuss that proof in detail here (I refer again to 
the analysis of Dummett [1977], pp. 94-104). However, the 
idea seems to be that a fully analyzed proof does not contain 
logically complex statements, but operates directly with the 
atomic statements that the complex statements would 
correspond to. In particular, instead of universal quantifica­
tions, the fully analyzed proof would contain all the state­
ments which constitute its instances -usually infinitely many:
“Now, if the relations employed in any given proof can be 
decomposed into basic relations, its ‘canonical* form (that is, the 
one decomposed into elementary inferences) employs only basic 
relations.
(...)
“These mental mathematical proofs that in general contain 
infinitely many terms must not be confused with their linguistic 
accompaniments, which are finite and necessarily inadequate, 
hence do not belong to mathematics.” (Brouwer [1927], p. 460 and 
Note 8 on the same page).
2.5.3. Infinite proofs. Dummett has pointed out that:
“(...) on the intuitionistic understanding of infinity, the only way 
in which we can draw an inference from infinitely many premisses
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is by recognizing that each of these premisses can be proved; and 
that, in turn, can be accomplished only by recognizing, of some 
general procedure, that it will yield a proof of each of the premi­
ses. Thus the only way of understanding the idea of an inference 
from denumerably many premises A(0), A ( l) , ... which is consistent 
with a constructivist outlook proves to coincide exactly with the 
intuitionistic interpretation of an inference from VraA(n)
.” ([1977], pp. 96-97).
However, this seems to eliminate the difference between 
Brouwer’s fully analyzed proofs and real ones. Indeed, in 
order to admit the actual existence of an infinite fully 
analyzed proof we would have to take a strong non-construct- 
ive standpoint; and otherwise, it seems, our idea of such a 
proof is exactly that of the finite procedure which would 
generate it in principle.
It is therefore surprising that Dummett ends up granting 
Brouwer’s contention:
“An intuitionistic proof involving inferences from universally 
quantified statements really is, therefore, what Brouwer main­
tains, a representation of a more fully analyzed proof containing 
inferences from infinitely many premisses.” (Dummett [1977], p. 
97).
To me it seems, on the contrary, that what Dummett has 
shown is that the notion of ‘fully analyzed proof’ cannot be 
made sense of, constructively, as something essentially
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different from an ordinary proof. In other words: that a proof 
concerning an infinite domain can never be ‘fully analyzed', 
because the only way of making sense of this constructively 
is through its finite representation.
2.5.4. The interpretation of -» again. In any case, the most 
serious difficulty in the definition of this notion of ‘fully 
analyzed proof' concerns the interpretation of — Indeed, as 
Dummett remarks it is easy to imagine how, within a fully 
analyzed proof, the different logical constants -except —> and 
would be eliminated in favour of more elementary state­
ments.
In particular, a statement A vB  would be replaced by either 
of the disjuncts, depending on which of them is really esta­
blished in the proof; a statement A a B  would be replaced by 
the two conjuncts; a statement 3xA(x) would be replaced by a 
particular A(c) for some construction c in the domain; and a 
statement \/xA(x) would be replaced, as we have seen, by all 
its -possibly infinitely many- instances. Then the resulting 
statements would be likewise replaced by more elementary 
ones by the same procedure; and this operation would be
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repeated until we had obtained in all cases the corresponding 
atomic statements, which could not be analyzed further.
However, it is not at all clear how we could reduce a 
statement A-+B  in an analogous way:
"Given a proof of A->B , this would involve generating in turn 
each putative proof of A, and either demonstrating it not to be a 
proof of A  or applying to it the transformation which will convert 
it into a proof of B. However, it appears quite contrary to the 
intuitionistic insistence on the impossibility of surveying possible 
proofs of a given mathematical statement to suppose that we 
could, in any such way, systematically generate a class of construc­
tions which should include all proofs of a given statement A.” 
(Dummett [1977], p. 102).
This is related to Dummett’s remarks concerning the 
reducibility hypothesis with respect to normal form proofs 
that we quoted in 2.4.8.
He concludes that it will not be possible to exploit fully the 
meaning of Brouwer's conditional until we have found a 
solution to this problem, something which seems very difficult 
([1977], pp. 103-104).
I agree; but I also wonder whether it is really so pressing 
to make such an exploitation, given the fact that until now 
the only serious attempt to do so -according to Dummett
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himself- was Brouwer’s proof of the bar theorem, which, as I 
said at the time, is incorrect.
Instead, we could content ourselves with the use of a more 
modest conditional, in which the only property of the proofs 
of the antecedent that could be used was precisely that of 
proving the antecedent, that is: that of establishing the 
intuitionistic claim attached to that statement. If we did that, 
a construction proving A-+B  would not be allowed t operate on 
the internal structure of the given proofs of A, but simply to 
extend  these proofs as to obtain proofs of B; and in that case 
our subsequent analysis of —» would be significantly simplified.
2.5.5. Negation. Dummett has noticed yet one more reason to 
appeal to canonical proofs, which concerns the definition of i;  
according to him: “to say that 0=1 is unprovable is to make a 
very large claim, namely that intuitionistic mathematics as a 
whole is consistent” ([1977], p. 397). Hence, each time we 
assert the denial of a statement we are relying on the fact 
that constructive mathematics is consistent.
However, Dummett argues, the reduction to canonical 
proofs would dissolve this problem: “numerical equations
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demand, for their proof or disproof, the simplest imaginable 
type of construction, and it is evident that there is not, among 
these, one that proves 0=1” ([1977], p. 397). Therefore, 
according to Dummett we could define a proof of “tA, not as 
a construction which transforms any proof of A  into an 
arbitrary proof of ‘0=1’, but one which transforms any proof 
of A  into a canonical proof of ‘0=1’. I do not think, however, 
that this is too big a problem, given that, in any case, there 
is little doubt about the consistency of constructive mathe- 
matic. Dummett says that the consistency of intuitionistic 
mathematics is as trivial for an intuitionist as is that of 
classical mathematics for a platonist ([1977], pp. 397-398); but 
this is not entirely fair, since most classical mathematicians 
are sensitive to the greater intuitive ‘feeling’ of consistency of 
constructive results, while, conversely, a strict intuitionist has 
no grounds in principle to believe that a classical non-cons- 
tructive theory should be consistent.
2.5.6. The operational interpretation again. In [1975] Dum­
mett had written:
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“The notion of canonical proof thus lies in some obscurity; and 
this state of affairs is not indefinitely tolerable, because, unless it 
is possible to find a coherent and relatively sharp explanation of 
the notion, the viability of the intuitionistic explanations of the 
logical constants must remain in doubt.” (p. 124).
In [1977] he insists:
“(...) no one can at present give a detailed account of canonical 
proofs even of statements of first-order arithmetic.” (p. 400).
However he also says:
“It would be a mistake to be stampeded by these considerations 
into a state of despair about the chances of showing the intuition­
istic theory of meaning to be viable.” (p. 399).
In any case, most of what we have seen in these two 
sections is somehow added ‘evidence’ for the suggestion that 
we should distinguish between the construction which carries 
the meaning of a given statement and the infinite variety of 
ways that we could use to convince ourselves that such a 
construction is within our reach -that is: that we could, at 
least in principle, produce it if we wanted to. In other words, 
that we should distinguish between meaning and proof.
In particular, if we adopted the operational interpretation 
(and hence referred simply to constructions, and not to proofs) 
then the distinction between canonical and non-canonical 
constructions in the sense of 2.4.1 would be clearly not
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needed: for example, a construction which performs A vB  must 
perform either A  or B , and there is no way it can do this 
indirectly -it is a construction, not a proof.
In fact, the distinction between canonical and non-canonical 
proofs, and the stipulation that a non-canonical proof is an 
argument to the effect that we know how to obtain in 
principle a canonical proof, suggests that we go a step further 
and distinguish directly between constructions and proofs; 
where proofs would be defined as arguments to the effect that 
we know how to obtain in principle the required construction.
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§2.6. Definitions in terms of ‘proofs from premises’
2.6.1. Introduction. One final attempt to overcome the 
difficulties in the definition of -» and which deserves to be 
examined is the appeal to the notion of ‘proof from premises'. 
The idea is to define a proof of A->B  as a proof of B  from 
premise -or hypothesis- A; and similarly, to define a proof of 
-'A as a proof of a contradiction _1_ from premise A.
This idea corresponds to Kolmogorov's definition of these 
two connectives in terms of mathematical problems, as we 
saw at the time, and also to with Heyting's definition of _1. It 
has since been adopted by Martin-Lof (e.g. [1987]), Sundholm 
[1986] and Bridges and Richman [1987] (p. 11).
Most authors assimilate this definition of the conditional to 
Heyting's, as if there were no essential difference between 
them -e.g. Martin-Lof [1987], p. 412. However, as we shall see 
immediately there are many non-trivial differences between 
them.
2.6.2. The appeal of this strategy. The appeal of this strategy 
is that the need for the judgement proof disappears: we 
should always be able to tell whether something is or not a
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proof of B  from premise A ; to be able to do that the only thing 
we need to know is the meaning of A  -its constructive 
meaning, that is- and see whether the argument convinces us 
that assuming that A  is correct then B  should be correct too.
Indeed, as a primitive notion, the idea of a ‘proof from 
premises’ is quite natural -at least when the number of 
premises is finite-, provided that we already know the 
meaning of both the premises and the conclusion. It is a 
richer and more general notion than that of ‘categorical’ proof, 
which constitutes a special case of it: the case where the 
number of premises is 0; and if only for this reason it would 
be a perfectly interesting notion to be examined from the in­
tuitionistic point of view.
Naturally we will always be able to transform any possible 
proof of A  into a proof of B , simply by appending to it our 
conditional proof of B  from premise A; but the transformation 
will be uniform for all those proofs, and external to them.
This means that if we take this definition we should give 
up the idea of making a full exploitation of Brouwer’s condi­
tional.
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Moreover, the fact that a proof of B  from premise A  might 
be used to transform all proofs of A  into proofs of B  is only a 
consequence of the definition, and not part of the definition 
itself. If A  turns out to be false, for example, then our 
conditional proof will not transform proofs of A into anything, 
because those proofs will never exist; but this does not in any 
way make the concept of a proof from premise A  less clear 
-the situation can be compared with that of Heyting’s defini­
tion, discussed in 2.2.5.
Hence, by what appears to be a simple change in wording, 
we seem to eliminate at once both the impredicativity and the 
need for the extra-proof which makes Kreisel’s interpretation 
non-inductive.
On the other hand, the adoption of this definition also 
means the renunciation of Brouwer’s conditional in its 
strongest sense.
2.6.3. —» and V. The strategy of defining —> and in terms of 
proofs from premises is somehow connected to another one 
designed for V, which consists in defining a proof of VxA(x) as 
a proof of A(x) with free variable x. As before, this leads to a
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uniform procedure to transform each object c into a proof of 
A(c), but only as a consequence of the definition.
Also as before, the need for a judgement proof seems to 
disappear; and most of the difficulties that occur with the 
definition of —> in terms of conditional proofs also arise with 
this definition of V in terms of proofs with free variables.
However, I shall devote a separate section -the next one- to 
discussing this other strategy.
2.6.4. Two elementary difficulties. One obvious fault in the 
definitions as given by all the authors mentioned in 2.6.1 is 
that they invoke the notion of proof from premises in the 
clauses for —> and ^ (in the case of Heyting, only for the 
latter), but they do not mention it in the other clauses. The 
definitions that result are bound to be ill-constructed, as I 
shall now show.
For example, a proof of A — is defined -as we have seen- 
as a proof of B  from premise A. If we suppose now that B  is 
a conjunction Ca D, we have that a proof of A ->B  will be a 
proof of Ca D  from premise A. However, the clause which 
defines proofs of conjunctions does not refer to premises: it
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simply says, applied to this case, that ‘a proof of Ca D  is a 
proof of C plus a proof of D  \  Hence the concept of ‘proof of 
Ca D  from premise A  ’ is left undefined.
In other words, this approach amounts to taking seriously 
the notion of ‘hypothetical proof’ (that is, a proof the pos­
sibility of which depends on certain premises); and in so doing 
we have to define what a hypothetical proof of a conjunction, 
of a disjunction, etc is. This is, by the way, the only serious 
way to treat negation in such a way that the clause is not 
vacuous in the relevant case, where the statement negated is 
intuitionistically false.
A related difficulty is that the definitions mention only one 
premise, when in fact it is very easy to see that often more 
premises will be necessary. For example, a proof of A  —» (B-* C) 
would be a proof of B-^C  from premise A, that is: a proof of C 
from premises A, B. It is quite obvious, however, that the 
number of premises will always be finite, since it cannot 
exceed the number of occurrences of -» and “»in the statement 
in question.
These two problems seem to have an immediate solution: 
to re-define all the clauses appealing always to some finite set
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of premises. However, when we try to do that we find further 
difficulties.
2.6.5. Premises which are themselves proofs from premises. 
Given a certain proof from premises, it might happen that 
some of these premises are themselves conditional or negation 
statements, and so they will also be analyzed as proofs from 
premises. Hence these ‘premises' will be, essentially, other 
proofs from premises.
The resulting structure is familiar from natural deduction 
systems. For example the rule of ‘introduction of the condi­
tional' -sometimes called precisely the ‘deduction theorem'- 
allows us to infer A  ->B  whenever, having A as an assumption, 
we have been able to deduce B:
r A
. B  
A -> B
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Similarly, the ‘elimination of disjunction' -or ‘proof by 
cases'- allows us to infer C from A vB  whenever we have 
separate deductions of C, from A  and from B:
r A r B
A vB L C L C
C
These examples -which are valid in both classical and 
intuitionistic logic- may help us to make sense of the notion 
of a proof which uses as premises the existence of other proofs 
from premises previously constructed.
However, it would be a mistake to rely on a particular 
deductive system and then to define proofs from premises as 
proofs within that system, since in that case we would need 
an independent semantic justification for that system. 
Dummett discusses this possibility briefly:
“It may be thought that (...) such a notion (...) of a proof of B  
from A  as hypothesis depends essentially upon the context of a 
particular formal system in which the proofs are carried out, and 
so would be inappropriate where we are concerned with intuitive 
proofs, not restricted to any formal system. Such a claim may be 
correct; but it is not evidently so, and reliance on it would 
therefore be imprudent.” Dummett [1977], p. 15.
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Hence the notion of ‘proof from premises’ should be taken as
primitive, or otherwise we would vitiate the whole project.
2.6.6. The inductive structure of the definition of the notion 
of ‘proof from prem ises'. If the definition is to be inductive we 
shall have to take into account the logical complexity of the 
premises too, since the understanding of an argument from 
premises will heavily rely on the meaning of those premises.
Accordingly, we could measure (for the purpose at hand) 
the complexity of a proof from -finitely many- premises as the 
sum of the total number of occurrences of logical constants in 
the premises plus those in the conclusion. Thus we would 
have to bear in mind that, in each of the clauses, the defini­
tion is given in terms of proofs from premises which are on 
the whole logically simpler -in this sense- than that of the 
proof being defined.
2.6.7. Atomic statem ents, a , —> and In particular, the case of 
atomic statements is treated as follows. Let A  be an atomic 
statement and &  a finite set of premises. If ^ i s  empty then
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the proof of A from premises reduces to a straight or
‘categorical’ proof of A, and we can apply our usual treatment. 
If is not empty then by the induction hypothesis of the
definition we already know the meaning of all the statements 
in &  -as well as that of A  of course-, since we already know
what is a proof (from no premises) of each of these state­
ments.
The proof of the atomic statement A  from premises then,
will simply be an argument to the effect that we can assert A  
assuming that we can assert all the statements in «^ . These
statements may very well be false and provably so by cons­
tructive methods: but all we require is an argument based on 
the assumption that they were assertable.
Next we proceed to give the clauses for a  and of course for 
-> and for which this whole strategy is intended. Let ^ b e
again a finite set of premises, and JL, as usual, a fixed 
contradiction:
(a) a proof of A a B  from premises &  is a proof of A  from 
premises plus a proof of B  from premises &
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(b) a proof of A-+B  from premises ^ is  a proof of B  from premi­
ses & u{A}.
(c) a proof of “iA from premises &  is a proof of J_ from premi­
ses
The clause for v, however, raises an additional problem 
which also appears in the corresponding clause for 3. I shall 
discuss the definition of 3 first.
2.6.8. The definition of 3. There seem to be two options for the 
definition of a proof of 3xB(x) from a finite set of premises
They are:
(a) a proof from premises ^ th a t an object c can be cons­
tructed and proved to satisfy the condition B(c);
and
(b) the construction of an object c, plus a proof of B(c) from 
premises
Dummett has shown quite clearly that the definition (b) is 
not feasible. In the following passage he seems to favour (b) 
as the natural definition of ‘proof of 3xB(x) from premises’; at 
the same time, he shows that this definition does not work. It
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is all somehow implicit, since he does not consider openly the 
choice between the two available options:
“Suppose we have a proof of B  from the hypothesis A: i.e. 
something that is like a proof of B  save that A  is cited as a 
premiss without justification. Then we have a method of transfor­
ming any proof of A  into a proof of B: namely, by appending the 
proof of B  from A  to the proof of A. Such an operation (...) is a 
uniform  operation: it does not depend upon the structure of the 
proof of A. Again, a proof of A -> £  does not have to take this simple 
form; it may be that we can recognize some operation which 
involves internal transformation of any given proof of A as never­
theless always yielding a proof of B. If this were not so, then we 
could not admit an inference from 
\/x(A(x)^>B(x))
to
3xA(x) -» 3xB(x)
as intuitionistically valid, since it would be impossible to derive a 
constructive proof of 3xB(x) by merely appending something to a 
proof of 3xA(x); we should need to know for which particular 
natural number n the proof of 3xA(x) yielded a proof of A(n)” 
[1977], pp. 14-15.
It seems from this quotation that according to Dummett’s 
conception, a proof from premises of a statement 3xB(x) is 
subject to condition (b); otherwise the precise n which 
satisfies the premises would not be needed.
Indeed, suppose that the properties A(pc) and B(x) were 
actually related, in the sense that an instance of B(x) can be
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obtained -constructively- by some transformations on an 
instance of A(x) -in the trivial case, for example, when B(x) is 
A(x) itself. If A(x) and B(x) are not related in some sense then 
a proof of 3xB(x) from premise 3xA(x) could not use that 
premise in any relevant way.
Then, in order to obtain a proof of 3xB(x) from premise 
3xA(x) according to the stipulation (b), we would need an 
instance of A(x). That is: the method for transforming instan­
ces of A(x) into instances of B(x) would not be enough. Since 
this method clearly constitutes a proof of Vx(A(x)-^>B(xj), the 
inference to 3xA(x)-*3xB(x) would fail.
It is plain that this does not happen under definition (a), 
and so Dummett is quite correct on the substance of his 
argument: the adoption of definition (b) will have as a result 
that certain intuitionistic inferences could not be validated. 
As Dummett considers that (b) is the only possibility, he then 
disregards the definition in terms of proofs from premises 
altogether, as we have seen from the quote -“a proof of A -> B  
does not have to take this simple form”.
In fact Dummett has independent reasons for rejecting the 
present definition of —» since, as we already know, he is a
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resolute defender of Brouwer’s conditional in its strongest 
sense.
2.6.9. More on the definition of 3. In fact, it is clause 2.6.8(a) 
which seems the most natural to me, and probably -I guess- 
the one that corresponds to what Kolmogorov, Martin-Lof and 
Sundholm had in mind, or would have preferred if confronted 
with this dilemma.
Indeed, this clause still contains the vital information for 
the constructive meaning of 3: that any proof of 3xB(x) should 
include an indication of how to find a particular instance. 
Being merely a proof from premises, it only requires that this 
indication help us to find such an instance, supposing that we 
already have proofs of each of the premises, and therefore 
that we are in possession of all the information provided 
therein.
However, it has a prominent limitation which the other 
does not: it ruins the inductive structure of the definition. 
Indeed, according to this clause a proof from premises of a
statement 3xB(x) is a proof from premises &  that ‘an object c
can be constructed and proved to satisfy condition B(x)’.
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However, the latter statement is a straight translation of 
3xB(x) into the metalanguage, and has exactly the same 
logical complexity. Moreover, it seems impossible to reformu­
late this clause so as to make it fit into the inductive struc­
ture without obtaining clause 2.6.8(b), which we already know 
is inadequate.
2.6.10. The definition of v. The definition of v  faces an 
identical difficulty. Suppose we were to put -with ^ a s  before:
(a) a proof of A vB  from premises 3P is a proof of A  from
premises &  or a proof of B  from premises
In that case we will have to admit for instance the inference 
C -> (AvB) [ -  (C->A) v  (C->B), 
which is not intuitionistically valid -for example, it is not 
deducible in the intuitionistic propositional calculus.
Hence the definition would have to read:
(b) a proof of A vB  from premises @ is a proof from premises
&  that either a proof of A or a proof of B  can be constructed.
However, as before, this definition is a direct translation 
into the metalanguage of the proof defined, and not an
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explanation in terms of proofs logically simpler than such a 
proof.
Ironically enough, it turns out that this strategy, whose 
main virtue was to avoid the difficulties in the definitions of 
—> and now manifests the most prominent limitation of
Kreisel’s interpretation -the collapse of the inductive struc­
ture of the definition- but with respect to two of the ‘opposite' 
operators: v  and 3.
2.6.11. The definition o/V. The interpretation of V in terms of 
proofs from premises does not face the same problem. Indeed, 
in this case the choice is between these two options again
as before:
(a) a proof of \fxB(x) from premises ^ is  a proof from premises 
^ th a t we can transform any construction of an object c in the 
domain into a proof of B(c);
(b) a proof of \/xB(x) from premises &  is an effective method
which transforms any construction of an object c in the 
domain into a proof of B(c) from premises <P.
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In this case, however, the two are clearly equivalent in 
meaning. In particular, from a proof from premises ^ th a t we
can transform each c into a proof of 5(c), it is very easy to 
obtain a method which transforms each c into a proof of 5(c) 
from premises all we will have to do is to apply the
previous proof to each given c; and the implication in the 
other direction -from (b) to (a)- is even more obvious.
Nevertheless we do not solve in this way the inherent 
difficulties of the definition of V. Indeed, in contrast with 
what happened in all the other clauses, (b) is not a ‘decidable’ 
clause -it is not conservative over the decidability of the proof 
relation induced. There might well be a construction which as 
a m atter of fact could transform every object c in the domain 
into a proof of 5(c), but, this not being evident, it requires a 
separate proof.
Then, if we want the definition to induce a decidable 
relation we could supplement (b) with a judgement proof 
-which would break its inductive structure anyhow. However, 
there is an alternative which also deserves to be explored: the 
definition of V in terms of free-variable proofs, which attempts 
to do for V exactly the same as the definition in terms of
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proofs from premises does for -> and I will discuss this 
possibility in detail in the next section.
2.6.12. Discussion. The definition in terms of proofs from 
premises is a most interesting attempt to overcome the 
difficulties in the interpretation of the conditional and 
negation. Although it does somehow fail, in that it cannot 
preserve the inductive structure of the entire definition, it 
remains a serious alternative to Kreisel’s interpretation for 
those who are sceptical about the full exploitation of Brou­
wer's conditional.
Unfortunately, this definition has not been sufficiently 
discussed in the published literature. In fact the only place 
where it is distinguished from Heyting’s interpretation of the 
conditional is Dummett [1977], pp. 14-15. Sundholm [1983], 
p. 159 or Martin-Lof [1987], p. 410, for example, still assimi­
late the two (also e.g. Troelstra and van Dalen [1988], p. 9); 
and none of the difficulties that I have treated in the sections
2.6.4, 2.6.9 and 2.6.10 had been investigated before.
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§2.7. Definitions in terms of ‘proofs with free variables’
2 . 7.1. Introduction. The approach discussed in the last section 
runs parallel to the attempt to overcome the difficulties in the 
explanation of V by appealing to the notion of proof with free 
variables, according to which a proof of VxA(x) would be a 
proof of A(x) with free variable x.
This strategy has been followed by Martin-Lof (e.g. [1987]) 
and Sundholm [1986], together with the definition of —> and -l 
in terms of proofs from premises. It also coincides with Gent- 
zen’s. Moreover, Martin-Lof [1987] (p. 412) attributes this 
definition to Kolmogorov, but as we saw at the time, Kol­
mogorov’s interpretation of V appeals to a general method to 
establish A(x) -or to solve it- for each x. As before, there is a 
non-trivial difference between these two formulations, which 
will be apparent immediately.
2.7.2. The idea of a free variable proof. As in the case of 
conditional proofs, the appeal of this strategy is that the need 
for a judgement proof disappears. We should always be able 
to tell whether something is or is not a proof of A(x) with free
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variable x, that is: an argument that A(x) holds for a fixed but 
otherwise arbitrary x in the domain.
Also as before, the notion of a free-variable proof -or 
equivalently, the proof of a formula which does not need to be 
a statement-, is quite natural, and a richer and more general 
notion than that of a ‘proof of a statement', which would 
constitute a special case of it. In fact, if only for this reason 
it would still be an interesting notion to be studied from the 
intuitionistic point of view.
The basic idea of a proof with a free variable is a proof 
which establishes that a condition holds for an object of the 
domain without specifying at all which object it is. However, 
the notion of a free-variable proof must be preserved as a 
primitive notion, or otherwise it would lose its independent 
interest. In particular, if we have a free-variable proof of A(x) 
it will follow at once that we have a method to prove A(c) of 
every object c in the domain. However, this should be con­
sidered as a consequence of the notion of ‘free-variable proof' 
and never as a definition of it -if it were, the need for a 
judgement proof would appear immediately.
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Naturally this notion should not be confused with that of 
a proof which uses free variables temporarily -e.g. to instan­
tiate a given quantification and to extract consequences- but 
whose final conclusion is a statement.
2.7,3. Two elementary difficulties. The definitions by Mar- 
tin-Lof and Sundholm suffer from two obvious shortcomings, 
exactly analogous to those discussed in 2.6.4 in relation to
On the one hand, the ‘proof with free variables' is only 
invoked in the clause for V; but then the terms in which this 
clause is given -e.g. ‘a proof of A (x)a B(x) with free variable x ’- 
will not in general be covered by the definition, and so the 
induction does not work.
On the other hand, the clause only mentions one free 
variable, while it is clear that often more free variables will 
be necessary.
As before, these two problems seem to have an immediate 
solution: to redefine all the clauses appealing always to some 
finite set of free variables.
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2.7A . The definition. The atomic case here is that of formulas 
in general, since they might contain free variables. However, 
it is very easy to adapt our usual treatment of atomic 
statements to those atomic formulas which contain free 
variables.
Indeed, if A is an atomic formula all whose free variables 
are among y l9 y 2, ..., y n9 then a proof with free variables 
yi> y?., • • • >  y n ° f the formula A  is an argument, with free varia­
bles y l9 y 2, ..., y n9 to the effect that the application of the cor­
responding decision procedure would confirm A; that is: an 
argument that the decision procedure would confirm A  for 
any values of y l9 y 2, ..., y n in the domain.
Next, all the propositional cases are obvious. In particular, 
the treatment of —» (and so of “•) can be easily obtained from 
the usual definitions: for example, supposing that all the free 
variables of A  and B  are among y l9 y 2, ..., y n, a proof with free 
variables y l9 y 29 ..., y n of the formula would be:
a method which transforms proofs with free variables 
yv  y<b •••> y n °f the formula A  into proofs with free variables 
yv  y 27 • • • >  y n of the formula B.
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However, it can also be given in terms of proofs from premi­
ses, as Martin-Lof and Sundholm do; in this case we should 
need to reformulate the whole definition in terms of the 
complex notion of ‘proofs with free variables from a finite set 
of premises' (the adaptation is also straightforward).
Now for the quantifier cases. The case of the existential 
quantifier is quite clear; let {ylt y 2, ..., y n} contain all free 
variables of 3xB(x), then a proof with free variables 
y l9 y 2, ..., y n of the formula 3xB(x) will be
the construction of an object c in the domain plus a proof 
with free variables y v y 2, ynof the formula B(c).
Notice that in this case there would be no point in requir­
ing, instead, that a proof of 3xB(x) with free variables 
y^ y 2 -> be ‘a hypothetical proof with free variables
y\i.y& —» y n that c can be constructed', since the free variables 
y^y^  can play no essential role in the plain construction 
of an object. Hence we can refer directly to the construction 
of c and thus preserve the inductive setting of the clause.
Finally, the crucial case whose treatment has motivated 
this definition: let B(x) be as before; then, a proof with free 
variables y l9 y 2, y n of the formula \/xB(x) is
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a proof of B(x) with free variables y v y 2, y n, x.
This clause needs no special comment.
2.7.5. The nature of proofs with free variables. The point of 
the present definition is that we keep the notion of proof with 
free variables as primitive. In particular, we should not try to 
explain it as ‘any proof schema which, when supplemented 
with any choice of particular objects nv n2, ..., nmJ yields a 
proof of the corresponding statement referring to those 
objects’.
If we do that then the definition will immediately collapse 
into one of the usual ones.
The conceptual difference between
(a) a proof of B(x) with free variable x 
and
(b) a method which transforms any construction of an object 
n in the domain into a proof of A(ri)
is that (a) designates a decidable property while (b) does not: 
if something does not convince us of the constructive ‘open’ 
statement A(x) -the statement that the condition A(x) holds 
for any construction of an object in the domain-, then it is not
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a proof of it. However, something might well be a method 
which transforms every object n into a proof of A(n) without 
being obviously so. Hence, if we want to ensure the decid­
ability of the resulting relation we will need a Kreisel’s 
judgement proof, and this would break the inductive struc­
ture.
Thus, the point of this definition is that the notion of proof 
with free variables is taken as primitive (particularly in the 
case of atomic statements, on the basis of which the whole 
definition is given). In this respect the present definition also 
behaves like the definition in terms of proofs from premises. 
Similarly, the concept of ‘proofs with free variables’ is also 
natural and appealing as an intuitive notion. It is obviously 
richer than that of a proof of statement (i.e. a formula with 
0 free variables) and, as before, if it were only for this reason 
it would be a perfectly interesting notion to be examined from 
the constructive viewpoint.
2.7.6. Inadequacy of this definition. With the present defini­
tion of V we seem to get the best of both worlds: it is indue -
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tive, and the resulting definition is decidable. However, the 
bad news is that the definition does not work.
This time we have a very easy example of an intuitionistic 
proof of a universal statement VxA(x) which is not a proof of 
A{x) with free variable x. The example is provided again by 
Dummett, and consists in a proof of such a statement by 
induction:
“Suppose that we have a proof of A(0) and a proof of 
Vx(A(x)->A(x+1)), which we may suppose for simplicity to have been 
obtained by means of a free-variable proof of A(je)-»A(:c+l). Then, 
for each n, we can find a proof of A(n). When n= l, we apply modus 
ponens to A(0) and A(0)->A(1); when n=2, we first obtain A (l) by 
the preceding modus ponens step, and then apply modus ponens 
again to A (l) and A(1)-»A(2); and so on.” Dummett [1977], p. 14.
In this case we do have a method which transforms each 
number n into a proof of A(n)\ but the result is not a ‘uniform' 
schema, that only needs to be completed with the number in  
question, just as an application form is filled in with the name 
of the applicant. A proof with free variables may be divided 
into various options (e.g. whether the variable x is 0 or not), 
but in this case the number of these options is infinite. This 
is why we cannot talk of a simple ‘proof with free variables'.
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Indeed, the resulting proofs will be of different lengths 
according to the magnitude of n. As Dummett says: “there is 
no uniform proof-skeleton (except one which allows explicit 
appeal to induction)” ([1977], p. 14).
Such a method cannot be considered a simple ‘proof with 
free variable’ in any genuine understanding of this notion.
2 .7.7. Conclusion. The argument presented in the preceding 
subsection seems strong enough to dismiss this attempt 
altogether, although recognizing that it was an interesting 
idea to be pursued.
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CHAPTER 3 
OTHER TOPICS
§3.1. The ‘unintended’ interpretations
3.1.1. Introduction. Besides the search for the intended 
interpretation of the logical operators, intuitionistic logic has 
been subjected to various other semantical investigations, 
which have led to a number of mathematical models for the 
intuitionistic predicate calculus. These models have an 
interest in their own right, among other things as efficient 
procedures for obtaining underivability results.
In the case of classical logic, for example, we can take the 
Beth-Smullyan method of semantic tableaux, which is highly 
effective for establishing the consistency of a finite set of 
sentences although it does not assign them -at least in 
principle- any plausible interpretation at all.
In any case, until the intended interpretation of the 
intuitionistic logical constants can be made fully rigorous, 
these models will remain the only available semantics that we
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can use in relation to the deductive systems, for example, for 
establishing soundness and completeness theorems.
3.1.2. Translations. In addition to this, we have a number of 
translations from intuitionistic logic into various other logical 
systems. Some of the most interesting ones are the transla­
tion into modal predicate logic (by Godel [1933], developed in 
McKinsey and Tarski [1948], Fitting [1969] and Shapiro 
[1985]), and the translation into the logic of dialogues (by 
Lorenzen [I960]; for further developments and a survey see 
Felscher [1986]). A recent and particularly interesting one is 
the pragmatic interpretation of intuitionistic propositional 
logic by Dalla Pozza (in Dalla Pozza and Garola [1995]).
Some authors, adopting a classical point of view, have tried 
to use these translations for defending the idea that the 
conflict between classical and intuitionistic mathematics 
dissolves into a mere problem of interpretation. However, 
they dismiss the intuitionistic critique to classical mathe­
matics, and have had little impact on intuitionistic mathe­
maticians and current contributors to intuitionism.
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3.1.3. K leene’s realizability. Kleene’s realizability, which first 
appeared in Kleene [1945], deserves special mention. This 
notion was directly inspired by Hilbert and Bernays’s analysis 
of the constructive import of an existential statement 3xA(x) 
as a partial communication of a more complete statement in 
which a particular number n with property A  is given, or at 
least a method for finding such n (Hilbert and Bernays [1934], 
p. 32). Kleene generalized this idea to all logical operators 
(e.g. ‘what completes A-^B  is an effective method by means of 
which we can transform whichever completes A  into that 
which completes B ’) (Kleene [1945], pp. 109-110). This idea is 
very natural and very much in line with the operational 
interpretation, and with Hey ting's explanations that a cons­
tructive statement demands that a construction is made. I 
shall not give full details of Kleene’s definition because, as we 
are going to see, very few people regard it nowadays as 
carrying the intended meanings of the intuitionistic logical 
constants.
Kleene identified the notion of constructive function with 
that of partial recursive function. Then he took the Godel 
numbers of these functions and constructed the definition as
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a numerical interpretation (to each statement we assign the 
Godel number of the partial recursive function which realizes 
it, if there is one). As it turns out, the basic relation (c 
realizes A) is not decidable; in this it coincides with the 
operational interpretation; the two differ, however, in the 
treatment of 3, since the number which realizes 3xA(x) 
‘includes’ information not only on the n such that A(n) -as it 
happens in the operational interpretation-, but also on the 
number which realizes Aijij).
Dummett has criticized the fact that the realization is not 
decidable, and, on those grounds, dismissed it as a semantical 
interpretation:
“We cannot, of course, effectively decide, for a given number n, 
whether or not it is the Godel number of a general recursive 
function, and so certainly cannot in general decide whether or not 
n r VxA(#) [n realizes VxA(jc)]. For this reason, the notion of 
realizability diverges very considerably from the intended mean­
ings of the intuitionistic logical constants.” (Dummett [1977], p. 
320).
In addition to this, if we adopt a classical standpoint with 
respect to realizability, then all classically valid sentences 
appear to be realizable (in particular, it is very easy to show, 
for example, that, for example, Av"iA or »A are realiz-
189
able). This had already been noticed by Kleene [1945] (p. 114) 
and Griss [1953] (p. 11), and later reaffirmed with respect to 
later versions of this notion by Kleene in Kleene and Vesley 
[1965]:
“Early in the investigations of 1945-realizability (since 1941), 
formulas were encountered whose realizability was only proved 
classically (...). In such a case, the realizability interpretation fails 
to exclude the formula’s being provable intuitionistically, but on 
the other hand, we lack adequate grounds for affirming that it 
should hold intuitionistically (...). The situation is the same with 
the present notion of realizability.” (p. 119).
Another problem is the identification of constructive 
functions with partial recursive functions, as pointed out here 
by van Dalen:
“Realizability differs in nature from semantic interpretations on 
several accounts. (...) it heavily relies on Church’s Thesis: ‘each 
algorithm is a partial recursive function’ (at least in motivation), 
which puts its stamp on the class of realizable sentences. This 
appears, e.g., from the fact that the first order version of Church’s 
Thesis is realizable. Hence the realizability interpretation is not 
faithful.” ([1979], pp. 137-138).
3.1.4. The range of interpretations of intuitionistic logic. The 
great variety of mathematical models for intuitionistic logic 
which are currently found in the literature can be classified
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into four main groups: topological models, algebraic models, 
Beth models and Kripke models.
Although most of them were originally proposed by classical 
mathematicians, and completeness -with respect to the 
intuitionistic predicate calculus- was proven by classical 
means, other versions and proofs have since been found using 
intuitionistic metamathematics only. Intuitionistic complete­
ness results usually seem weaker if we compare them directly 
with their classical counterparts, but this is only natural if we 
consider the dramatic changes in the meaning of the results 
as well as in the proof methods.
Both Kripke models and Beth models allow a heuristic 
motivation very much in accordance with the intuitionistic 
conception of mathematical knowledge -and even with the 
verificationist interpretation. The interpretations of the other 
two groups are more properly called ‘unintended': whether 
they could serve as a genuine semantics is out of the question.
In the present section I shall give a detailed definition of a 
Kripke model and I shall analyze to what extent it succeeds 
and to what extent it fails to capture the intended interpreta­
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tion of the intuitionistic predicate calculus. Beth models 
-which are very similar- will be discussed more briefly.
This is a well-established point, so no originality will be 
required for our task -cf. in particular Dummett [1977], pp. 
403-418.
3.1.5. Kripke models. Kripke models were first defined in 
Kripke [1965]. The material is very standard now. The 
following definition of a Kripke model contains a progression 
of stages, representing the continuous growth of mathematical 
knowledge. Each stage will be characterized by a basic 
background of mathematical facts known at that stage. Then, 
the growth of knowledge from one stage to the following will 
be strictly cumulative: all discoveries made at a particular 
stage will be preserved henceforth, that is, will be automa­
tically incorporated into the basic knowledge of all later 
stages.
At each stage different possibilities of progress will be 
allowed according to the various mathematical discoveries 
that we can achieve at that stage. However, there will be no
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' obligation to pass from one stage to another if new discoveries 
have not been made.
Let Sf be a first-order language without equality -as
described in 0 .6 .1. A Kripke model &  for 3 f consists of the
following ingredients:
(a) A non-empty set U  called the universe of
(b) A mapping that assigns to every constant c of 3fan object 
»(c) of U.
(c) A non-empty set S  whose members are called the stages of 
ft.
(d) A (reflexive) partial order < on S. If s ,s 'e S  are different 
and such that s<s' then we shall say that s' is a later stage 
than s; moreover, if there is no r e S  such that s<r<s' then we 
shall say that s' is an immediate successor of s. Finally, we 
let s '> ls  mean s<s'.
(e) A mapping that assigns to each n-ary predicate symbol F  
and stage s, a subset ®S(F) of Un -i.e. a set of n-tuples of 
members of C7- in such a way that for any two s ,s 'eS  if s<s' 
then &s (F)cz®s, (F).
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Intuitively speaking the elements of $ts (F) are those 
members of Un which are, at stage s, known to be in the 
relation corresponding to F. This knowledge will be preserved 
in all later stages, since for any s'>s, Sl8(F)cSt8.(F).
At s the other members of Un might be known not to be in 
that relation or might be undecided, but the difference 
between these two groups will not be reflected in the model. 
A Kripke valuation 3? based on ft is a mapping that assigns
to each variable x of 3? a member 3f(x) of U. Also, if c is any
constant we put Jf(c)=ft(c).
Moreover, if x is any variable and ueU, we let 3?[x/u] be the
valuation which assigns the object u to the variable x and is 
otherwise identical to 33. In any case, notice that since U  is
non-empty and therefore we know how to produce an element 
u of U, we also know how to construct at least one valuation 
based on ft; namely, that in which all variables receive the 
value u.
3.1.6. Forcing. We now define the relation of a Kripke valua­
tion 3? forcing a formula cp at a stage s e S  (briefly s ||— c^p).
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For atomic formulas, let F  be an n-ary predicate symbol of 
-2"and terms of
s \h ^ F (tv t2,...,tn) if g na(F).
Hence an atomic formula will be forced by a valuation <^at a
stage s when at that stage the objects that 3? assigns to the
terms t l9 t2, tn are known to be -in that order- in the 
relation corresponding to F.
Next, let cp and vj/ be any formulas of Jif, x  any variable and
s ' also belong to S:
(a) s ||—ycp  if s'jjf—^ cp whenever s'>s;
(b) s ||—& cp —>\}/ if s '||— vj/ whenever s '>s and s  '||—-x  cp;
(c) S IHr<PW|/ if s  |K*.<p or s Ib>v;
(d) s ||—-^ tpAvj/ if s  ||—^ (p and s \\—x y ,
(e) s ||— E^bccp if there is a we U  such that s  ||—j?[x/u](p;
(f) s||—jfVaxp if s'||—jr[XMcp whenever s'>s and ue U.
If a  is a sentence it is easy to see that its value at a given 
stage is invariant with respect to the valuation, and thus we 
let s ||—ad (that is: $  forces the sentence a  at stage s) be the 
case when s ||—#  a, where is any valuation based on
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Finally, we say that a formula (p of 5? is enforceable when 
there is a Kripke model ^  for 5P, a stage s and a valuation 3? 
based on $  such that s ||—x  cp.
3.1.7’ Kripke models in action: an example. The best way to 
illustrate how Kripke models work is with an example. Let 5?
contain a unary predicate symbol Ff and consider the sen­
tence -IVx(F,(x)v-lFr(x)). This sentence is inconsistent classically, 
but not intuitionistically (that is: it might be added as an 
axiom to the intuitionistic predicate calculus without des­
troying its consistency).
Accordingly, there is a Kripke model for it: a Kripke model 
in which, at a given stage, _IVx(F(x)v -'Fix)) is forced. In fact it 
is very easy to find such a model.
We define a model $  whose universe is the set N  of natural 
numbers and whose stages form an infinite linear sequence
<S—{s0,5i ,S2 •
Next we put for each sneS, ®Sn(F)={0,l,2,...,7i}. Hence, at 
stage sn we know that all numbers from 0 to n have the 
property corresponding to F; and at the following stage sn+1 
we will discover that the number n+1 also has the property.
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Finally, we let {Xo^Xg,...} be variables of Jzfand ^ b e  the
valuation based on ® such that for each xn we have Jf(xn)=n.
Then we reason as follows. At each stage sn, the formula 
F(xn+1) is not yet forced by so snjjf—jr F(xn+1). However, that
formula will be known to be true at the next stage, and hence 
forced by 3? at that stage. Therefore -by 3.1.4(a)-
sJ h x  ~'F(xn+1). Hence by 3.1.4(c) s„JJSr % i ) v % i ) ;  and it 
follows at once -by 3.1.4(f)- that s„Hf—^ x(F(x)v~>F(x)).
However, this happens for all sn, so it will also be the case, 
in particular, for all later stages sm for m>n. Hence by 3.1.4(a) 
again, sn ||—^  Vx(F(x) v  ~^ F{x)). Moreover, since “> Vx(F(^) v  ~^ F{x)) 
is a sentence,
S n ih-#-'Vx(F(x)v-'F(x))
We have thus found that in fact any stage in this Kripke 
model forces -lVx(F(x)v -,F'(x)).
3.1.8. Discussion. As we can see, Kripke models have, in 
common with the verificationist interpretation, that they 
adopt an epistemic point of view. It is not how things are 
which matters as much as what the subject knows (or can
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prove) about them. This is in plain accordance with the 
constructivist philosophy of mathematics.
Indeed, the clauses for a , v  and 3 which appear in this 
definition are exactly similar to those of Heyting’s interpreta­
tion -if only we read s s i —na  as ‘we can prove a  at s ’. The major 
difference lies in the clauses for the ‘difficult’ operators, —>
and V.
This is clear from our example in the previous subsection. 
On the one hand the fact that -l Vx(F(x)v “,F1(x)) is so easily 
enforceable in a Kripke model illustrates the technical 
qualities of these kind of models for obtaining consistency 
results; and on the other, the nature of the model provided 
also illustrates what is left out in this type of semantics.
For after describing we still do not have a way of un­
derstanding ^Vx(F(x)v^F(x)) that permits us to assert it, 
simply because the model above does not ascribe any real 
meaning to the predicate symbol F. We end up without 
knowing any concrete number-theoretical predicate for which 
we can assert -l Vx(F(x) v -li (^x)).
Thus, we end up not knowing the meaning of the whole 
sentence either.
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As it happens, it does not even follow from the model that 
there must exist such a predicate. What E displays is a condi­
tion typical of a predicate for which we could assert the 
sentence in question -a condition which establishes what 
could be our cognitive relation with such predicate. However, 
this condition is not yet a content of the predicate.
Similarly, the clause corresponding to -»for instance, seems 
to be establishing a consequence of the meaning of "» rather 
than its content. This meaning makes it inevitable that if we 
get to know a sentence one day, we shall never discover a  
later; but clearly what is meant by uttering <-ia ’ must be 
something different -and it is. As Kreisel has written:
“Kripke’s interpretation is not regarded as an explanation or 
‘reduction’ but as asserting properties of these logical operations 
obtained by reflection upon their meaning.” ([1971], p. 146).
3.1,9. Beth models. Beth models are in exactly the same 
situation as Kripke models. In fact, the two of them are very 
similar even in the technical details; the main difference, 
roughly speaking, being that in a Beth model we are regularly 
forced to pass from one stage to another, whether we have
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discovered new facts or not. That is why in general Beth 
models look slightly more complicated than Kripke models.
For example, to account for our sentence ~1 Vx(P(x) v  "'Fix)) we 
would have to add after each stage an alternative route with 
no new discoveries, in case we are forced to move on before 
the next number has been checked out. Then, representing 
each stage by the last sentence decided, we would have
That is, we start by discovering that F(x0) holds -always under 
our valuation Jf- and from then on we either discover that
the next number also has the property, or reach a new stage 
without more information.
P(Xo)
P(Xo) P(X i)
P(Xq) P(Xj) P(xx) P(x2)
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In any case the discussion above applies equally well also 
to these models.
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§3.2. Same accusations of incoherence
3,2.1. Introduction. Part of the traditional defence of classical 
mathematics from the intuitionistic critique has rested on 
arguing that the intuitionists rely on too vague assumptions, 
and that its basic notions such as ‘construction', or the 
intended meanings of the logical constants, are very obscure.
As I commented at the beginning of the thesis, some critics 
have gone further and claimed that the intuitionistic mean­
ings of the logical constants are actually incoherent. That is: 
that they are not only obscure and vague, but that they are 
necessarily so, because behind them there is no coherent 
picture at all.
In fact, part of the motivation for addressing the problem 
of this thesis lies precisely in trying to determine whether 
these people are right or wrong; therefore, it is only fair that 
I devote a last section to discuss some of the attempts which 
have been produced in recent times to show that the in­
tuitionistic logical operators are essentially incoherent.
I must stress that I shall only consider those criticisms of 
intuitionism which have tried to show that the meanings of 
the intuitionistic logical particles cannot be made precise (so
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that I remain faithful to the consideration of the topic of the 
thesis), but I shall not discuss general criticisms against in- 
tuitionism, of any other kind. Moreover, I shall only consider 
a few recent arguments, with no attempt to cover all of them, 
but rather, with the purpose of giving a taste of which lines 
these arguments usually take -I have chosen those which 
seemed most interesting to me. Also, I shall concern myself 
only with the intuitionistic logical constants as primarily 
intended, that is, as the logical operators of any other 
fragment of a natural language other than the mathematical 
one.
3,2.2. Heilman on the communication problem. Heilman
[1989] has argued that the intuitionistic logical constants are 
insufficient to express certain basic facts about themselves 
(about their own status and behaviour) which are essential 
for the motivation of intuitionistic against classical mathe­
matics. In particular, he focused on the impossibility of 
expressing intuitionistically the idea of absolute un­
decidability. He acknowledges that this is a fact well-known 
to the intuitionists (he refers on p. 60 to a quote from
Dummett [1977], p. 17 that a proof that a statement is 
absolutely unprovable amounts intuitionistically to a refuta­
tion of it).
Heilman stresses that without this notion the usual 
motivation for intuitionistic logic is not feasible:
“Take for example intuitionism’s stance on ‘the law of excluded 
middle’. How does it motivate its refusal to accept this law 
(admittedly without having to claim to refute it)? Not by the paltry 
observation that there are propositions which we now can neither 
prove nor refute. (...) Now, I take it, what gives real force to 
intuitionism’s stance is that this may never happen (...).” (p. 62).
However, he writes, this possibility is not expressible intui­
tionistically: indeed, the corresponding universal quantifica­
tion ‘for every stage of knowledge, there is at least one 
unsolved problem’ would have to be read classically, because 
intuitionistically it would mean that we have a method to 
generate a new unsolved problem in every situation, which is 
obviously false and not what was intended.
He quotes Dummett [1977] to illustrate the fact that 
intuitionists, in their critique to classical reasoning, adopt 
such notions:
“Since we can be virtually certain that the supply of such 
unsolved problems will never dry up, we can conclude with equal 
certainty that the general statement will never be intuitionistically
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provable. Such a recognition that a universally quantified state­
ment is unprovable does not amount to a proof of its negation 
(p. 45 of Dummett [1977], quoted on pp. 63-64 of Heilman [1989]).
However, as Heilman remarks, the ‘never’ in this statement 
has to be read classically, or the paragraph would not make 
sense. In fact the second part of the last sentence of this 
quotation -which Heilman omits- is also very interesting:
“Such a recognition (...) does not amount to a proof of its 
negation, since the proposition is not, as it stands, a theorem or 
even a mathematical proposition at all.” (Dummett [1977], p. 45).
This means that Dummett realizes immediately that the 
proposition in question -that there will always be unsolved 
problems- implies a certain reification and that strictly 
speaking is not intuitionistically meaningful.
3.2.3. Discussion. Heilman’s point is an interesting one, which 
can be found in other authors in somewhat different forms. 
Two things should be noticed here. First, that the type of 
motivation for intuitionism that Heilman criticizes is only 
needed in the context of a structuralist dominated ideology,
i
but it is not essential for the actual practice of intuitionistic 
mathematics (Heilman would probably agree on this).
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Secondly, I think that it is quite possible to reconstruct 
these motivations using strict intuitionistic language. In 
particular, the justification of the rejection of the law of 
excluded middle would have to be based only on the existence 
of particular instances of unsolved mathematical problems, 
and not on the plausibility that there will always be some, 
because this possibility implies a reification which makes 
sense classically, but not intuitionistically. Indeed, each 
unsolved mathematical problem is a counterexample to the 
law of excluded middle as intuitionistically interpreted.
Heilman is right in my opinion in pointing out that in- 
tuitionists set a bad example by using classical language to 
motivate the rejection of classical mathematics, and that they 
should be more careful; but this critique is not so lethal.
3.2.4. Hossack on the meaning of negation. In [1990] Hossack 
presents an argument against the intuitionistic definition of 
negation which is somewhat related to the argument by 
Heilman that we have just seen. Hossack’s main contention 
in this paper is that, unlike the classical case, an intuitionist-
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ic user of negation has to have thoughts which are not ex­
pressible in the corresponding intuitionistic object language.
There are essentially two of these thoughts. The first one 
is the thought that the assertability conditions for a given 
statement at a particular time do not obtain, that is: that we 
do not have a proof of it. Hossack relies heavily on the decid­
ability of the proof relation, an assumption which he takes 
from Dummett. Hossack reasons as follows:
“Therefore they [the intuitionists] have to know for each A  what 
it would be for a construction to be a proof of A. But (...) they 
cannot know what it would be for a construction to be a proof of 
A, unless they also know what it would be for a construction not 
to be a proof of A ” (Hossack [1990], p. 215).
If this happens with each particular construction we can 
generalize:
“Thus they cannot know what it is for the assertability condi­
tions to be fulfilled, unless they also know what it is for the 
assertability conditions to fail to be fulfilled.” (p. 215).
Then:
“The thought that the assertability conditions do obtain can in 
a sense be expressed by the proposition itself. But there is no 
sentence to express the thought that they do not obtain. The only 
possible candidate for such a sentence is the negation of the 
proposition, and that is already reserved for a different use.
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‘This shows that there are thoughts that a competent user of L 
needs to be able to have to use the language correctly, but which 
cannot themselves be expressed in L [where L  is a mathematical 
language to be interpreted in terms of assertability conditions].” (p. 
215).
I partly agree with Hossack here. In fact this observation is 
not new. Heyting [1956] had already noticed it:
“Every mathematical assertion can be expressed in the form: ‘I 
have effected the construction A  in my mind’. The mathematical 
negation of this assertion can be expressed as ‘I have effected in 
my mind a construction By which deduces a contradiction from the 
supposition that the construction A  were brought to an end’, which 
is again of the same form. On the contrary, the factual negation of 
the first assertion is: ‘I have not effected the construction A  in my 
mind’; this statement has not the form of a mathematical assert­
ion.” (p. 19).
Indeed, the point here is that the statement that the assert­
ability conditions do not obtain is not a mathematical 
statement proper. This does not mean that we cannot express 
it at all; on the contrary, the statement, for example, T do not 
have a proof of A y is perfectly acceptable from the construct­
ive standpoint (provided that we agree on the decidability of 
the proof relation, which is one of Hossack’s premises). 
However, it is not a mathematical statement proper, and
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hence there is no reason why we should want to have a 
logical or mathematical operator which corresponds to it. 
According to Hossack:
“Note the sharp distinction between intuitionist and classical 
negation here. The user of the classical negation also needs to be 
able to have the thought that the truth conditions for A  do not 
obtain. But this thought is always expressible in the classical 
language itself, if it is equipped with a sign for classical negation. 
Thus the user of the classical language, unlike the user of L, does 
not need to have any thoughts that cannot be expressed in the 
language.” (p. 216).
However, if we consider, in the classical case, the respective 
thought that T have not proved A ’ or ‘I do not know whether 
A  is the case’, we see that the speaker needs to be able to 
have these thoughts to be able to use A  correctly (in par­
ticular, to assert it adequately or refrain from asserting it), 
but they cannot be expressed with a mathematical symbol.
Of course these type of thoughts will not be needed in the 
mere process of understanding an utterance of a given 
sentence, neither in the classical nor in the intuitionistic case; 
but if we consider the mastery of the language as a whole, 
then these type of thoughts are probably needed in both cases.
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3.2.5. More about Hossack on negation. The second thought 
to which Hossack refers is that the statement ‘0=1’ -which 
appears often in the definition of is an unprovable state­
ment; and relatedly, the thought that it is impossible to prove 
both a statement and its negation (assuming “iA  is defined as 
A-»0=1):
“But we cannot express in L our knowledge that it is absurd to 
suppose that 0=1 can be proved [where L  i s  as before]. The best we 
can do within L is to say not(0=1), which is just 0=1 ->0=1. (...) 
Thus the knowledge that A  and “!A are incompatible is not 
something that one can learn just from the rules of L by reasoning 
within L.
“(...) We can imagine someone who knows only the assertability 
conditions believing themselves to have proved both A  and iA , if 
they thought they had constructed a proof of each proposition. In 
thinking this, they would be breaking none of the assertability 
rules of L (...) This is again in sharp contrast with the classical 
case. To be credited with a grasp of the truth conditions of 
negation, the user of the classical negation must treat a proposi­
tion and its negation as incompatible- If someone seriously 
asserted both A  and “tA we would simply conclude that they had 
not grasped the truth conditions concerned.” (p. 217).
However, this is not fair, because it is impossible to know the 
constructive meaning of 0=1 (that is: in  terms of basic calcula­
tions) without realizing that it is false -i.e. that there can be 
no proof of it.
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Hossack is right in that this is equivalent to claiming that 
the whole of intuitionistic mathematics is consistent, but this 
is something quite obvious in the case of intuitionistic mathe­
matics. On the other hand, he is also right in that a state­
ment of absolute unprovability (as we have seen before) 
implies a classical claim and a certain reification, and hence 
if we try to solve it by a semantic ascent to a metalanguage, 
sooner or later we will have to find classical negation at some 
level (which would destroy the whole project) (p. 218).
However, in that case the fact that intuitionistically this 
thought is not expressible is more a virtue than a defect.
My conclusion is: Hossack is right that there are thoughts 
classically obvious that constructivists simply cannot make, 
because they reject reification; but they are not strictly neces­
sary for their practice of mathematics.
3.2.6. Hossack on the meaning of the quantifiers. In a second 
paper [1992] Hossack articulates similar arguments against 
the intuitionistic quantifiers. In particular, he claims that 
given the clause for the intuitionistic V, the speaker should 
necessarily have an explicit knowledge of the metalanguage.
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Hossack focuses on the status of the extra-clauses, and how 
the speaker is to be attributed knowledge of the relevant 
condition:
“The constructivist theory (...) demands that object language 
speakers who grasp the meaning of ‘all n are P* should recognize 
of a construction that for all n it yields a proof of P(n). (...)
“What has to be recognized here is the obtaining of a certain 
state of affairs described by a sentence of the metalanguage.” (p. 
85).
Then, Hossack argues that if this knowledge is to be explicit 
knowledge at the level of the metalanguage, another metalan­
guage would be required for the metalanguage, and we would 
end up in an infinite regress. However, he writes:
“It may be replied that constructivism does not need the 
assumption that the ability to recognize that a construction is a 
proof should take the form of explicitly thinking this thought in an 
appropriate language.” (p. 86).
In fact, previously he himself had referred to a theory of 
propositional attitudes to dissolve the circularity of a classical 
theory and complement it:
“The success of a classicist theory of meaning will then turn on 
its containing a second component, a theory of propositional atti­
tudes, which explains what it is for a person to grasp an abstract 
object of this sort.” (p. 85).
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However, this, alleges Hossack, is not available in the case of 
the constructivist quantifiers:
“Thus the explanatory force of the constructivist truth theory 
can turn on its appeal to recognitional capacities possessed by 
speakers quite independently of any linguistic competence.
“This defence is plausible in the case of the connectives of 
sentential logic, which is decidable both classically and construc­
tively. (...) But there can be no hope of a similar account in the 
case of quantification, for no mechanical device can capture our 
conception of generality.” (p. 86).
However, here Hossack makes a fallacy of equivocation. 
Because the ‘fact' to be recognized here is not the universal 
fact itself, but the fact that a given construction proves the 
universal fact. These are two very different things. Then he 
writes:
“Suppose we had a device with a detector which checked items 
for some property, and another detector causally sensitive to items 
that are still unexamined. The device could tell us if VxP(x) were 
false. If \/xP(x) were true it could tell us so if there were only 
finitely many cases for it to examine. But our judgements about 
the truth of VxP(x) go beyond the deliverances of the device. For 
we will say VxP(x) is true even if the device itself never returns an 
answer. For if it never will, that can only be because \fxP(x) is true.
It is therefore clear that what the device says does not capture our 
conception of generality. Nor is there a superior device which could 
fill this role, as the recursive unsolvability of the halting problem 
shows.” (p. 87).
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However, the point was not detecting \/xP(x), but detecting 
whether something was a proof of it; and for that reason 
Hossack has not shown that we cannot have a theory of 
propositional attitudes which correspond to it and explain it.
In the rest of the paper Hossack argues that the natural 
language quantifiers are not constructive, something which 
could be true, and does not pose a problem to us.
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CONCLUSION
The problem which I have addressed in this thesis (the 
intended interpretation of the intuitionistic first-order logical 
operators) is an extremely difficult one. After more than sixty 
years of research, and the contributions of some very eminent 
philosophers and mathematicians, no solution to it has been 
found which is wholly satisfactory.
In this thesis I have argued in favour of the interpretation 
which I have called the ‘operational’ interpretation. This 
interpretation is essentially a reformulation of Kolmogorov’s 
and Heyting’s interpretations, where the notions of ‘proof’ 
and of ‘solution to a problem’ have been replaced by that of 
‘performing’, and the appeal to proofs from premises has been 
completely eliminated.
I have explained that the operational interpretation is in a 
better position than any of its competitors. In particular, I 
have argued that if one wants to dispense with Kreisel’s 
extra-clauses, the one cannot maintain the concept of ‘proof’ 
as the basic concept of the semantic definition of the logical 
constants; therefore Heyting’s interpretation is untenable,
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unless we replace in it the concept of ‘proof' by a different 
notion. Moreover, I have also shown that Kreisel's inter­
pretation as it stands is redundant, and that in order to 
eliminate its redundancy we must reformulate this interpreta­
tion in a way which makes it rely on the operational inter­
pretation; I have therefore concluded that the operational 
interpretation is more basic, and for this reason it is more 
adequate as a fundamental semantical explanation of the 
logical constants. Furthermore, I have argued that the 
interpretations in terms of ‘proofs from premises' that have 
been put forward so far, are as they stand defective, and that 
we cannot resolve their deficiencies while preserving at the 
same time the inductive structure of the definition; and 
finally, I have shown -following Dummett- that the interpreta­
tion in terms of ‘proofs with free variables', which is closely 
related to the interpretation in terms of ‘proofs from premi­
ses', is inadequate as well.
Despite all this, however, I think that it would be prema­
ture to conclude that the operational interpretation is the 
final solution to our problem. Indeed, this interpretation also 
carries some problems with it; in particular, the fact that its
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basic semantic relation -that of ‘performing’- is not decidable, 
confers a certain non-constructive character to the operation­
al interpretation. I have suggested that this non-constructive 
character is so small that the interpretation could still be 
acceptable from the intuitionistic point of view, but this a 
difficult issue, and I am far from being certain.
The debate remains, thus, essentially open, for new 
arguments to come -or perhaps, new modifications on the 
existing interpretations. The difficulties of the project might 
throw a certain pessimism upon us, but we have to bear in 
mind that all the attempts that have been made to show that 
the problem is intrinsically unsolvable have also failed, as I 
have explained in the last section of this thesis.
Finally, I would like to remark that if a problem such as 
the present one remains alive today, is because it is not only 
one of extreme difficulty, but also one of extreme importance. 
Indeed, the whole philosophical basis of intuitionism crucially 
depends on the possibility of clarifying its most fundamental 
notions, and among them, its logical concepts. If this clarifica­
tion is finally attained, intuitionism -or constructivism- would
217
constitute no doubt a much more serious alternative to the 
other philosophies of mathematics.
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